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ABSTRACT 
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the proceeds of crime into the Canadian real estate market, driving up the price of 
home ownership for working-class Canadians. This thesis explores the relationship 
between FINTRAC financial transaction reporting in all sectors and suspicious 
transaction reporting in the real estate sector respectively with the MLS composite 
home price index. The findings suggest that greater action is needed by real estate 
representatives to increase the difficulty of elite criminals to profit from weak regulation 
and enforcement in the industry. The proposed recommendations include a commission 
incentive to encourage real estate agents to submit suspicious transaction reports, a 
national database of beneficial ownership identification, and improved public awareness 
of the occurrence of money laundering in real estate. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
White collar crime is notoriously difficult to detect (Hansen, 2004) and white 
collar criminals are an extremely dangerous group (Brody & Kiehl, 2010). In particular, 
money laundering, defined as “the act of disguising the source of money or assets derived 
from criminal activity” (Transparency International [TI], 2019, p. 6), often goes 
undetected but poses a significant risk to the global economy (Tellechea, 2008; Singh & 
Best 2019). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the value of money 
laundering may be as high as 5% of global GDP, nearly $1.5 trillion USD. This is 
especially alarming given that only an estimated 50 cases of money laundering have been 
prosecuted in Canada in the past 10 years (Expert Panel on Money Laundering in BC 
Real Estate [Expert Panel], 2019). 
Since the proliferation of COVID-19 as a global pandemic, stealthy criminals are 
using it as an opportunity to exploit the financial system’s vulnerability. The Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental organization which seeks to achieve 
international coordination to reduce money laundering and terrorist financing. It has 
found a surge in electronic fund transfers with COVID-19 noted as the purpose to avoid 
further scrutiny (Zaia & Jennings, 2020). As well, the Financial Transactions and Reports 
Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) has lowered the requirements of due diligence, 
including the verification of customer identities (Zaia & Jennings, 2020). Overall, 
government efforts have been directed towards developing responses to and managing 
the progression of COVID-19 on Canadian healthcare systems and the Canadian 
economy (Financial Action Task Force [FATF], 2020). Therefore, as opportunities for 
money laundering mount in connection to COVID-19, anti-money laundering (AML) 
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regulations and enforcement have taken a back-burner. At the same time, Canadians 
continue to experience widespread income loss, and thus affordability and stability of 
housing has become an increasing problem (Association of Municipalities Ontario 
[AMO], 2020). In essence, it is evident that during times of rapid change such as the 
COVID-19 pandemic, criminals will take advantage of opportunities that present 
themselves. This unfolding is indicative of the state of protections for the public against 
financial crimes.   
1.1 Money Laundering: Damages to the Individual and the Economy 
For the personal protection of our wealth and emotional well-being, it is 
paramount to detect and halt the efforts of money launderers. However, the damage of 
money laundering extends beyond the impact to the immediate victim, as it also harms 
entire communities and economies. In essence, this money, the proceeds of crime, ends 
up in the legitimate financial market, invested primarily at banks but also in property. 
Therefore, given the extensive financial means of launderers, indicated previously as 
roughly 5% of GDP globally, investments made with this substantial amount of money 
can artificially inflate price levels in a community. 
Furthermore, the purchase of residential property is a predominant technique of 
money launderers to integrate funds into the legitimate economy. Given access to large 
amounts of cash and favourable credit terms when using company names, money 
launderers have a significant economic advantage in the real estate market. As a result, 
home prices are exaggerated and the housing market may be stifled by an inability of the 
working class to enter the buying market. Ultimately, illegal property purchases deter 
their legal counterparts (Quirk, 1997). On the other hand, owning real estate is unjustly 
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advantageous to criminals, as it helps them to “self-finance, diversify, and grow” (Levi, 
2002, p. 183). Specifically, the Expert Panel on money laundering in BC real estate 
(2019) notes that residences may be used to facilitate drug and/or human trafficking, 
leaving the community to pay the price of crime, overdoses, and deaths, all while making 
a return on their investment. 
The aforementioned illicit property use illuminates the participation of another 
key party, organized criminals, who similarly integrate the proceeds of crime into real 
estate investments. As a brief prelude to the following sections, money laundering, white 
collar crime, and organized crime are defined. First, money laundering is a financial 
crime which conceals the criminal origins of profits (Gottschalk, 2010; TI, 2019). White 
collar crime operates in the legitimate business realm whereas organized crime relies on 
the underground economy to provide illicit goods and services (i.e., drugs, weapons, 
prostitution, etc.) to the public (Albanese, 2015). Although there are stark differences 
between the organization and services of businesses led by white collar and organized 
criminals, they nonetheless share the need to transfer the proceeds of crime to licit 
investments, and thus both rely heavily on money laundering strategies. In an effort to 
illuminate the social inequalities of money laundering and its impact from a social justice 
perspective, this thesis will focus on the operationalization of money laundering by white 
collar criminals, using their position and status for greed and financial gain. 
Intermittently, illustrations of money laundering by organized criminal groups will be 
used to underline relevant specific harms and costs. 
Overall, money launderers take advantage of the existing regulatory climate. 
Similar to the exploitation of the vulnerability inherent to the global pandemic, money 
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launderers also identify and capitalize on loopholes in the financial and real estate 
industries. In particular, Canada has become a haven for international and domestic 
money laundering. This is primarily due to the opaque ownership of Canadian real estate 
and the weak regulation and enforcement measures outlined in the Proceeds of Crime 
Money Laundering Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA), an act designed to respond to, 
detect, and deter money laundering. It is largely this concealed ownership that keeps 
detection rates at less than 1% and conviction rates at only 11% (TI, 2019). Hence, there 
is a pressing need for a shift from a reliance on criminal enforcement to a preventive 
regulatory approach (Freilich & Newman, 2018).  
1.2 Thesis Roadmap 
This thesis demonstrates that while the harms of money laundering may not be 
immediately visible, they are nonetheless damaging. The real estate market is specifically 
used to illustrate this argument. Further, a case is made for increased regulation of the 
real estate industry. In what follows, Chapter 2 examines the existing body of literature 
on white collar crime with a particular focus on money laundering. Chapter 3 explains the 
methods used to test the hypotheses and contribute to the existing gaps in the body of 
knowledge. Chapter 4 details the research findings and their relevance to the criminal 
opportunity structure. Chapter 5 acknowledges how this paper advances the academic 
discourse and provides recommendations to diminish money laundering activities in the 
real estate sector. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
A variety of theoretical perspectives may be used when studying the behaviour of 
white collar criminals. In the 1930s, Edwin Sutherland first termed it ‘white collar crime’, 
using it to illuminate the wealth disparities in the criminal justice system. Sutherland 
(1940) also developed his own theoretical explanation of white collar crime, as learning 
law-breaking behaviours by those in close relationship, coined ‘differential association’. 
Since, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) explained white collar crime with their general 
theory of crime, which points to a lack of self-control shared among all criminals. While 
not dismissing the important contributions and advancements of these scholars, this thesis 
utilizes a theoretical perspective not commonly used to explore crimes of the elite; that of 
environmental criminology.  
Instead of trying to understand the motivations and behaviours of perpetrators, the 
framework of environmental criminology looks to identify factors in the environment to 
prevent the crime (Wortley & Mazerolle, 2008). Under the umbrella of environmental 
criminology, routine activity theory (RAT) is used to explore the potential of place 
managers to block criminal opportunities. While the term place manager is 
conventionally used to refer to a manager at a physical place of business, this thesis uses 
it as a reference to the provider of services on behalf of a company, and specifically that 
of real estate agents. Therefore, this section will begin with the history and common 
theories of white collar crime, and then move to an explanation of the use of 
environmental criminology theories to better address its prevention. 
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2.1.1 The History and Common Explanations of White Collar Crime 
The study of criminology has been primarily focused on crimes of the lower class. 
To this end, it has been detrimental to already marginalized groups, as they have been the 
prime target of enforcement agencies, policy makers, and scholarly research. 
Furthermore, Edwin Sutherland was one of the first researchers to highlight the class bias 
of the criminal justice system. He acknowledged that conventional explanations for crime 
are not adequate, as they do not accurately capture crimes of both the upper and lower 
class. Specifically, pointing to poverty does not explain white collar crime as it does 
street crime for the following reasons: (1) data linking criminality to lower 
socioeconomic status is inherently flawed due to the absence of upper-class recordings of 
criminality in the samples used; (2) white collar criminals seldom experience poverty; 
and (3) severe economic hardships and roots of criminality in childhood are not evident. 
Thus, Sutherland proposed differential association, which purports that criminal 
behaviour is learned either by close contact with law-breaking individuals or a lack of 
close contact with law-abiding individuals (Sutherland, 1940).  
While Sutherland brought upper-class criminality to the forefront by highlighting 
the crimes committed and sample skewness, his theoretical explanation is largely 
unaccepted by the academic community (Simpson & Weisburd, 2009). Some key 
criticisms of differential association theory includes its measurement difficulties with 
respect to exposure to crime, and that exposure itself is sufficient enough to result in 
criminal behaviour. As well, a general theory of crime is one of the most popular theories 
used to explain white collar crime. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) stipulate that low self-
control explains all types of criminal tendencies, but this claim has been widely contested 
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primarily because white collar crime involves a careful weighing of opportunities, risks, 
and benefits and these individuals achieve high status in their careers thus portraying high 
self-control and low impulsivity (Geis, 2000). Essentially, the general theory of crime is 
indeed far too general to accurately describe white collar crime (Palumbo, 1992), and 
undermines the extent of harm of white collar crime and applicability of regulations to 
tackle it. Therefore, the decision to use Rational Activity Theory as the guiding 
theoretical framework is appropriate. 
2.1.2 Environmental Criminology: Routine Activity Theory 
While not specific to financial nor white collar crime, environmental criminology 
theories are especially useful in determining how to best intercept criminal behaviour. 
The environmental perspective’s primary objective is to block crime over curing the 
offender (Wortley & Mazerolle, 2008). Simply, environmental criminology aims to 
understand the trends and patterns of criminal activity, and the factors which influence 
them. The three pillars of environmental criminology are: (1) the environment plays an 
active and important role in criminal behaviour; (2) crime is clustered where the 
environment permits opportunities; and, (3) altering the criminogenic factors of 
environments can prevent opportunities for crime (Wortley & Mazerolle, 2008).  
The environmental perspective is relevant to the financial crime of money 
laundering given the strategy of money launderers to invest funds where there is the least 
risk of detection. That is, money laundering, like other crimes is concentrated at places 
which allows its activity. Furthermore, particular sectors are exploited by money 
launderers given weak regulation and a lack of private sector participation to interrupt the 
criminal process. Therefore, it is observed that the environment enables money 
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laundering in the arenas where there is less regulated and enforced measures to combat it, 
including suspicious transaction reporting and Know-Your-Client principles. 
Moreover, routine activity theory falls under the umbrella of environmental 
criminology, and argues that the “opportunity structure” of the crime must be analyzed to 
identify where interference/modification is necessary (Benson et al., 2009). In adherence 
with the environmental perspective, it does not attempt to explain the motivations behind 
criminal behaviour, but rather focuses on the intersection of the minimal elements which 
can create or prevent opportunities for crime (Eck & Clarke, 2003). Specifically, routine 
activity theory uses the crime triangle whereby the inner shape is of a perpetrator’s 
inclination to commit a crime, a suitable target, and a viable opportunity for crime, and 
the outer triangle outlines the corresponding controllers, to identify key points of 
interception when an offender and a target meet in time and space (Eck & Eck, 2012).  
Initially it was purported that guardians, protectors of the targets, were key to 
preventing criminal opportunities (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Then, Felson (1986) 
suggested that offender handlers, including those in close relationships with offenders 
(i.e., family, friends, and intimate partners), could also effectively intercept the criminal 
process. Finally, Eck (1994) added place managers as reducing opportunities for crime to 
occur in their places of business. Therefore, crime flourishes where there is a 
“convergence in space and time of the three minimal elements of… violations: (1) 
motivated offenders, (2) suitable targets, and (3) the absence of capable guardians against 
a violation” (Cohen & Felson, 1979, p. 589). In all three cases, increasing the perceived 
risk of detection changes the opportunity structure to be less desirable to criminals or 
would-be criminals (Webster, 2015). 
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Furthermore, it is imperative to identify if controllers are present for each of the 
elements in the crime triangle, namely handlers of offenders, guardians of targets/victims, 
and managers of places accordingly (Felson, 1995; Benson et al., 2009). Moreover, 
implementing controllers intercepts the crime triangle by blocking the opportunity for 
crime. If they are found to be present, their effectiveness should be assessed, and if not, 
points of interference should be identified (Benson et al., 2009). Moreover, place 
managers have an additional layer of responsibility for regulating crime at their place of 
business, as otherwise they are profiting from criminal activity (Eck, 2018). In addition, 
negative externalities are borne by the general public and can be seen as “crime as 
pollution” (Farrell & Roman, 2006; Eck, 2018). Essentially, the negative externalities at 
crime hot-spots are inherited by primary stakeholders with the exclusion of the business 
owner (e.g., employees, consumers), the community (e.g., increased government services 
needed and thus higher taxes), other local businesses, and the immediate social circle of 
offenders (Eck & Eck, 2012). Moreover, “the costs of crime to victims, taxpayers, and 
communities can be substantial, and criminal justice agencies are not well placed to 
reduce the opportunities, temptations, and provocations that are side effects of many of 
the social and technical developments we otherwise welcome” (Tilley, 2012, p. 369). 
Therefore, transferring the costs of business back to the owners is important for the well-
being of the collective society. 
Forming partnerships with private businesses to reduce opportunities at places 
expands the reach of policing while not incurring increases to public costs or resources 
(Webster, 2015). Specifically, the extension of responsibility to guardians of places, also 
known as place managers, are particularly important given that few places produce or 
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“pollute” a majority of crime (Eck & Eck, 2012). Common examples of criminogenic 
places include car parks and bars (Eck & Eck, 2012), but can also be tacitly applied to 
financial institutions and real estate agencies. In the case of money laundering, for 
example, it is concentrated at financial institutions, casinos, insurance, and real estate, 
among others (FATF, 2016), and thus it makes logical sense to target only the sectors 
which launderers are exploiting. Furthermore, place managers are particularly relevant 
for money laundering, as greater surveillance mechanisms at these institutions can 
increase the risk perception to possible offenders and thereby reduce crime levels 
(Berghoff & Spiekermann, 2018). Moreover, the concentration of money laundering as a 
problem in real estate specifically is largely due to a lack of response and intervention by 
industry members. Therefore, greater action by real estate agents as place managers is 
warranted to alter the opportunity structure for the investment of laundered funds in 
Canadian real estate (place) to make it less desirable to would-be criminals. 
2.2 White Collar Crime Literature 
A review of the literature surrounding white collar crime is integral to this thesis 
in order to understand who is behind the financial crime of money laundering. More 
specifically, it is important to focus on the benefit of laundering of proceeds of crime, 
through the lens of an elite criminal. Through an analysis of the use of money laundering 
by white collar criminals, it becomes apparent how to best deter their criminal activity. 
Moreover, their calculated and rational behaviour, coupled with their attraction to the real 
estate market as a method of investing large sums of criminal funds, highlights the 
criminal detection and enforcement gaps of this sector.  
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At its core, white collar crime should highlight crimes which are not typically 
investigated in criminology (Sutherland, 1949). White collar crime was first notably 
defined as, “a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the 
course of his occupation” (Sutherland, 1949, p. 9). The definition has since been 
expanded to describe the characteristics of a white collar criminal as deceitful, 
untrustworthy, manipulative (intentional acts), and stealthy (intentional and concealment) 
(Pickett & Pickett, 2002). The criminal groups are also diverse in that they may be 
composed of full-time, part-time, legitimate, and illegitimate stakeholders with varying 
levels of sophistication (Levi, 2012; von Lampe, 2008). Given the diversity of white 
collar crime, the exact definition and exclusions are a hot topic. Scholars differ in their 
categorization of white collar crime. Pusch and Holtfreter (2020) suggest it may be sorted 
by many variables, including offense versus offender-based and occupational versus 
corporate crime. Briefly, occupational crime benefits the employee, or in other words is a 
crime against the corporation, and corporate crime benefits and is by the corporation 
(Clinard & Quinney, 1973).  
Despite differences of opinion regarding the definition and varying compositions 
of white collar crime groups, it is agreed upon that the profile of a white collar criminal is 
significantly different from that of a conventional criminal. Firstly, while conventional 
criminals are typically viewed as being from the margins of society, both racially and 
socioeconomically, white collar criminals represent the opposite situation. In other 
words, conventional criminals are commonly regarded as being motivated to offend by an 
overall lack of legitimate opportunities, whereas white collar criminals belong to the 
middle-to-upper class and are in pursuit of greed. In particular, minority groups, 
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specifically those of low socioeconomic status, youth, and females are unlikely to act as 
white collar offenders (Braithwaite, 1985). White collar criminals are commonly more 
educated, situated in a career, belong to the middle and upper class, and are Caucasian 
males (Tyler, 2009). Given their more elite status, the fear of falling from their esteemed 
lifestyles serves as a reminder of what they risk losing if caught in a criminal scheme 
(Piquero, 2012). This is an important finding which highlights the contrasting 
motivations behind white collar crime and conventional crime, specifically that 
conventional criminals are enticed by financial means which could significantly improve 
their status, whereas white collar criminals may be deterred by the risk of diminished 
status if their financial schemes are revealed.  
In addition to not belonging to marginalized groups, some key distinguishing 
factors which separate white collar criminals from mainstream criminals are their non-
violent, unemotional, and rational nature (Tyler, 2009). Characteristically, white collar 
criminals do not act in the heat of the moment and are not perpetrators of crimes of 
passion. Instead, they are logical and carefully plan their criminal acts to increase their 
wealth (Tyler, 2009; Borlini, 2013). They weigh the risks and rewards, and base their 
decisions on only the most potent likelihoods of success. White collar crimes are 
grounded in logic, careful financial forecasts, and a solid understanding of the legal 
frameworks in all operating countries (Tyler, 2009; Borlini, 2013). 
Due to the aforementioned, it is difficult for individuals to conceive of white 
collar criminals as not being part of the socially included circle; part of the ‘us’ group 
(Levi, 2012). Arguably most importantly, white collar criminals also do not view 
themselves as ‘criminals’ (Sutherland, 1949). Furthermore, white collar criminals are 
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treated favourably in the criminal justice system due to their esteemed social ranking 
(Sutherland, 1940). With reference to socioeconomic status, the upper class has more 
power than the lower class to influence the criminal law and proceedings (Sutherland, 
1940). In contrast to the lower class, the upper class often receives little punishment for 
their deviant acts, and when they do, it is typically in the form of civil fines and penalties 
(Sutherland, 1940). Attempts to resonate with the judge and humanize oneself by citing 
extreme situations and especially atypical behaviour for one’s personality is 
commonplace (Benson, 1985). Further, exemplifying superior achievement in one’s 
career and a lack of prior record helps white collar offenders to argue that the offense was 
not part of their normal patterns of life (Benson, 1985). In summary, throughout the 
criminal justice process, upper-class criminals are privileged with many advantages. 
Specifically, the bias against the poor occurs at every stage of the criminal justice 
process, with an emphasis on the definition, identification, conviction, sentencing, and 
media portrayals of criminal acts (Reiman, 2004). In summary, it is important to 
recognize the privileges and positions of white collar criminals as it relates to their 
utilization of money laundering techniques in order to explore deterrence routes. 
Therefore, the fundamentals and applications of money laundering will also be discussed, 
as it relates to the transference of white collar crime proceeds into the legitimate 
economy.  
2.3 Money Laundering Literature 
Gottschalk (2010) proposes four main categories of financial crimes, namely 
corruption, fraud, theft, and manipulation with sub-categories including money 
laundering, cyber crime, embezzlement, insider trading, and identity theft. 
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Fundamentally, money laundering is the act of concealing dirty money (Levi, 2002). In 
particular, money laundering, defined as “the act of disguising the source of money or 
assets derived from criminal activity” (TI, 2019, p. 6), often goes undetected but poses a 
significant risk to the global economy (Tellechea, 2008; Singh & Best 2019). The funds 
laundered are generated from a variety of crimes, given its differing roots in white collar 
and organized crime, thus including drug and human trafficking for the latter, and are 
found in multiple sectors of the economy. Money laundering can represent a source of 
funding for terrorist groups, even if profit is not their aim (Covlea, 2016). Moreover, it 
has been evidenced that money laundering enables criminal activity by allowing the 
criminal organizations to “self-finance, diversify, and grow” (Levi, 2002, p. 183). 
Essentially, money laundering is the link which connects dirty, criminal money to the 
legitimate market.  
Furthermore, the need for money laundering is on the rise. Specifically, 80% of 
Swiss bank employees surveyed believed that white collar crime had grown in the past 
five years, and 61.1% indicated it would continue to grow in the upcoming five years 
(Isenring, 2008). Therefore, the need to conceal and integrate illicit profits will only 
increase in the near future, given a greater pool of funds generated from white collar 
crime. Moreover, the motivation for the originating crime is best diminished when the 
cash from the criminal endeavours cannot be legitimized (Levi, 2002). Therefore, greater 
risks to the process of money laundering are needed to ensure the would-be rewards of its 
profits are sacrificed. The common areas of study related to anti-money laundering 
include enforcement, regulation, and the use of technologies to detect suspicious 
transactions (Singh & Best, 2019). All in all, money laundering is not simply a financial 
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crime, as its prime ability to transfer funds into the legal economy is the driving force 
behind a plethora of profit-driven crimes (FATF, 2020. Simply, if crimes are not 
profitable, then the motivation to commit them is drastically reduced (Levi, 2002). 
2.3.1 The Process of Money Laundering 
Despite its various techniques and sectors used, money laundering advances 
through shared steps to clean dirty money. It is typically illustrated as a three-stage 
model, namely placement, layering, and integration (Gottschalk, 2010). First, in the 
placement stage, the proceeds of crime enter the legitimate financial system, followed by 
the layering stage, which conceals the origins of the funds, often done in the form of 
multiple transactions, accounts, and financial institutions (Gottschalk, 2010). Reaching 
the integration stage is ultimately the goal, as in this stage, the proceeds are able to be 
used legitimately in the economy, including investment in the real estate market 
(Gottschalk, 2010; Covlea, 2016).  
The exact techniques used in the three stages of money laundering are dependent 
on the finesse of the criminal group. Moreover, Schneider (2004) puts forth a typology 
for money laundering processes, based on the level of sophistication of the 3 inherent Cs: 
to covert, conceal, and create value, as well as the scope of the process, funds, and 
distance traversed. Specifically, the typologies range from basic to advanced international 
based on the aforementioned criteria (Schneider, 2004). Regardless, the money 
laundering process helps to identify critical points of intervention. 
2.3.2 The Methods of Money Laundering 
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Money laundering takes place in many forms, which is one reason it is so difficult 
to detect. Smurfing, falsifying documents, property theft, electronic transfers between 
banks, parallel transactions, and derivatives are just some of the techniques used for 
money laundering (Quirk, 1997). Schneider (2004) identifies the most common methods 
of money laundering, namely the use of nominees, making multiple smaller transactions, 
and creating the illusion that the funds are sourced legitimately through business activity, 
either by mixing licit and illicit funds or by establishing shell companies. Sterling (2015) 
asserts that unlike legitimate businesses who want their ownership clearly linked to all 
assets, money laundering systems often use nominees to conceal the true beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, companies are particularly alluring to criminals because of their monetary 
value if dissolved, easier qualifications for credit, and stronger relationships with 
customers (Korsell et al., 2016). As a response to the strategy of companies holding 
criminal funds, there has been increased licensing, zoning, and registration requirements 
(Korsell, 2018). Therefore, while ownership may be hidden behind business names and 
nominees, increasing regulations in the sectors which money launderers participate is a 
strong mechanism against their criminal activity. 
Moreover, understanding the types of companies utilized helps to understand how 
best to deter the criminal activity they participate in. Gottschalk (2008) proposes a 
conceptual model of financial crimes carried out by businesses, plotting their progress by 
the stage of organized financial crime over time. The model starts with an agency 
business whereby employees execute the crimes, then alliance businesses which partner 
with criminals, network businesses which involve some employees in all levels in illegal 
activities, and finally, mafia businesses whereby all employees at all levels are involved 
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in the financial crimes of the organization (Gottschalk, 2008). This model is especially 
useful when looking at money laundering as a financial crime carried out by mixed-fund 
businesses or shell companies in order to determine the responsible parties to face 
criminalization. 
2.4 Investing the Proceeds of Crime 
Money laundering is the transfer of proceeds of crime into the licit financial 
system. Using the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) proceeds of crime (POC) 
records, Schneider (2004) shows that the main crimes generating criminal proceeds are 
(1) drug trafficking, (2) illegal liquor and tobacco trade, and (3) fraudulent activities, 
including theft. It is thus clear that money laundering is enabling a diverse range of 
crimes, both white collar and organized, with a significant majority involving contraband 
and addictive substances. Further, Schneider (2004) finds that the proceeds are stored 
predominantly in (1) deposit institutions, (2) insurance-related firms, (3) automotive 
assets, and (4) property purchases. Therefore, the criminal funds are placed in the same 
investments that a law-abiding citizen would choose. 
Moreover, money launderers are logical and follow the same investment 
principles as ordinary members of society. Simply, the bank is the obvious answer when 
there is nothing to conceal (Sterling, 2015). Individuals involved in criminal networks 
weigh the risks of prosecution against the risks of victimization associated with holding 
large amounts of cash (Sterling, 2015). In essence, laundering operates by working 
around the financial system’s investigative regimes (Levi, 2002). Money launderers 
exploit opportunities and loopholes in the financial system in order to minimize the risks 
and maximize the rewards.  
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2.4.1 Real Estate Purchases with the Proceeds of Crime 
The proceeds of crime are commonly invested in residential property (Quirk, 
1997). For example, real estate may be purchased under a corporation or nominee’s 
identity either with no mortgage, or a high or low loan-to-value ratio mortgage (Expert 
Panel, 2019). The residential real estate market is used strategically for money laundering 
as a long-term investment vehicle due to its low liquidity. Accordingly, the transactions 
relate to the integration, placement and layering, and integration stages (Expert Panel, 
2019). Detecting the investment of proceeds of crime in property purchases is especially 
challenging given that the aforementioned situations also represent legitimate market 
transactions (Expert Panel, 2019). This is an important point, as many real estate 
members equate money laundering as large or full cash transactions exclusively, an 
assumption that clearly needs to be challenged (Expert Panel, 2019). Therefore, it is 
understandable why criminals choose to invest the proceeds of crime in property, since 
their behaviour mimics real market transactions, and thus the risk of detection is 
drastically reduced. 
Moreover, the real estate market is inviting to money laundering endeavours 
given its ability to house criminal operations, opaque structuring allowing for 
concealment of beneficial ownership, and its secure, stable, and strong potential for 
economic growth (Borlini, 2013; Expert Panel, 2019). Moreover, owning property can 
generate capital gains, rental revenue, and the capacity to easily falsify prices to grow 
wealth (Expert Panel, 2019). There are three main purposes for mortgage fraud in 
particular, namely to advance other crimes, to drive a profit, and to provide shelter (von 
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Lampe, 2008). Specifically, mortgage fraud may facilitate additional crimes, including 
money laundering and drug operations in the residence thereby increasing the crime rate 
in the neighbourhood (von Lampe, 2008). Pertaining specifically to money laundering, 
mortgage fraud may be used to adjust the value of the property by offering a side 
payment to the seller which is not recorded on the books, and then listing it for its true 
value (von Lampe, 2008). Similarly, Schneider (2004) claims that money laundering 
through real estate houses criminals, fakes mortgages, abuses solicitor-client privilege, 
and with the involvement of organized criminal groups, facilitates drug cultivation and 
manufacturing, as well as the sex trade and illegal gambling. Above all, residential 
property is known to be a secure investment and able to hold its value with relative 
stability throughout time. 
Additionally, von Lampe (2008) specifies that mortgage fraud will also increase 
as global technologies continue to improve. Further, it is noted that communities with 
income and price disparities which are undergoing regional change or development, are 
disproportionately targeted (von Lampe, 2008). Transitioning communities are thus 
exploited and segments are further marginalized. To boot, as globalization has 
proliferated, the effect on the real estate market has worsened (Tellechea, 2008). 
Nonetheless, real estate members argue that they do not play a role in money laundering 
and should not be hindered by additional requirements as this would harm a crucial part 
of the economy (Tellechea, 2008). However, the true danger resides in failing to interrupt 
criminal proceeds from entering the real estate market. Detrimentally, illegal property 
purchases deter their legal counterparts (Quirk, 1997), as home prices are artificially 
inflated and confidence in the market is eroded.  
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2.4.2 The Impact of Illicit Investment in the Canadian Real Estate Market 
Canada is a prime target for the integration of laundered funds. Unfortunately, it 
has become a haven for international and domestic money laundering, primarily due to 
the opaque ownership of Canadian real estate and the weak regulation and enforcement 
measures documented in the Proceeds of Crime Money Laundering Terrorist Financing 
Act (PCMLTFA).  Beyond this, Transparency International (2019) highlights that relaxed 
rules surrounding disclosure of beneficial ownership provide a haven for those looking to 
remain anonymous while integrating funds, further allowing detection rates to rest at less 
than 1% and conviction rates at only 11% (TI, 2019). To this point, Hundtofte and 
Rantala’s (2018) study (based on FinCen 2016 data) found that mandated geographic 
targeting orders of beneficial ownership in the U.S. for real estate purchases over $1 
million resulted in a 66% decline in shell company real estate purchases with no 
mortgages, as well as a 4.2% decrease in house prices. 
Furthermore, mortgage fraud is more common in Canada’s most populated urban 
hubs, specifically in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia (Von Lampe, 2008). 
In the Greater Toronto Area between 2008 and 2018, residential mortgages amounting to 
more than $25 billion were provided by unregulated lenders, thus escaping all anti-money 
laundering procedures mandated for financial institutions and regulated mortgage brokers 
(TI, 2019). Unregulated mortgages were taken out at a rate of 50% of all corporate 
purchases of residential properties, compared to only 3% for individual buyers (TI, 
2019). Moreover, this proportion is especially significant given that greater than 50% of 
homes appraised at more than $7 million in the GTA are owned by companies (TI, 2019). 
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Therefore, Transparency International’s (2019) findings suggest that mixed-funds and 
shell companies are using the proceeds of crime to anonymously purchase expensive 
residential properties. Hence, taken altogether, there is a pressing need for a change in the 
handling of money laundering operations, and ultimately a shift from a reliance on 
criminal enforcement to a preventive regulatory approach.  
2.5 Social Environment and Perception of Harm 
Despite the aforementioned effects of money laundering on the economy, the 
public has a slanted perception of the magnitude of harms it poses. As first identified by 
Sutherland in 1940, the criminal justice system has continued to focus on the crimes 
committed by the lower socioeconomic groups of society while shielding the upper class 
from criminalization, thus creating an inaccurate image of the most perilous threats 
(Reiman, 2004). In conjunction, the media’s depiction of one-on-one crimes maintains 
the construct that they are the true danger to society, and in doing so, also showcases the 
poor as the typical criminal, given that individual-level crimes are most commonly 
performed by this demographic (Reiman, 2004). Thus, society does not view money 
laundering as a serious endangerment to public safety or welfare (Hansen, 2009).  
It is apparent that society does not view money launderers as villains like they do 
other criminals. On the one hand, Hollywood portrayals of organized crime make the 
criminals idealized and relatable, thus hampering the perceived severity of their acts 
(Weatherby et al., 2016). Moreover, Levi (2014) points to Ipsos MORI Scotland 2013 
data which found that residents believed organized crime is primarily comprised of drug 
trafficking, followed by money laundering, and human trafficking. The survey results 
also indicated a sense that the government has failed to convey that organized crime 
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affects citizens on an individual level, and further, that citizens do not feel threatened by 
organized crime unless there is an easily identifiable group, such as the mafia, present in 
their neighbourhood (Levi, 2014). In essence, individuals generally understand what 
organized crime consists of, but nonetheless do not feel endangered by it. 
On the other hand, knowledge of white collar crimes is weak. Since white collar 
crimes are often not in plain sight, they are easier to ignore and be naïve to. Interestingly, 
in one study, when asked to rate their understanding of white collar crime, 85.71% of 
respondents indicated that they believed they had a “moderate” or “very good” 
understanding, yet 97.62% said that the public was not well-informed about white collar 
crime (Weatherby et al., 2016). Therefore, it would seem that the vast majority believe 
they have a stronger understanding of white collar crimes than the general population. As 
well, it was found that 60.71% and 64.29% of the sample believed that violent crime and 
white collar crime could be justified (Weatherby et al., 2016). Similarly, there is a split 
response between the two types of crime as to which type of crime is more detrimental to 
society overall, with white collar crime being the response 45.83% of the time 
(Weatherby et al., 2016). This showcases the underlying lack of understanding of the 
extent of victimization of white collar crime, as it far outnumbers the victims of violent 
crime, organized and otherwise. 
While white collar crimes are often not visible, it does not mean that they should 
be viewed less punitively; white collar criminals are an extremely dangerous group 
(Brody & Kiehl, 2010). Furthermore, in contrast to organized criminals, white collar 
criminals are generally not regarded as violent. However, this is contested by some 
scholars. While Weatherby et al. (2016) state that white collar crime is non-violent and 
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thus considered less dangerous, Brody and Kiehl (2010) counter this argument and claim 
that white collar criminals should not be considered as non-violent as this is not only 
inaccurate, but also helps their reputation. Further, it is dangerous to assume that white 
collar criminals do not have violent tendencies, as this results in diminished perceived 
seriousness (Brody and Kiehl, 2010). In fact, Weisburd and Waring (2001) found that a 
mere 15.1 percent of convicted white collar criminals had a criminal history of only white 
collar offenses, thus suggesting that their records could also include violent crimes. 
Moreover, white collar criminals’ violent tendencies tend to increase as the risk of 
detection increases, even going so far as to murder whistleblowers and other involved 
parties, out of pure desperation (Brody & Kiehl, 2010). Therefore, the misconception that 
white collar criminals do not have the potential to be violent needs to be corrected. It 
should be understood that as the risks increase, their level of aggression is likely to, as 
well, in connection with their strategically organized sophistication. 
It can also be seen that the likelihood and length of prison sentences for white collar 
crimes is substantially less than that for conventional criminals. According to 
imprisonment rates from the U.S. District Court in 2010, the longest average sentence of 
a white collar crime was for money laundering at 30.6 months, significantly lower than 
even the shortest sentence for a violent crime, namely assault, and substantially less than 
the longest sentence for a violent crime of murder, at 276.1 months (Weatherby et al., 
2016). Therefore, white collar crimes face sentences that are much less than traditional 
crimes, yet are much more prevalent, with white collar crime incident rates ranging 
between 224 and 8,065 cases, whereas violent crime cases ranging from 39 to 631 
(Weatherby et al., 2016).  
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Similarly, the likelihood of imprisonment for white collar crime is substantially 
less, with the 5 most serious violent crimes within 4 points of 100% and the 5 most 
serious non-violent crimes ranging from 62.9% to 77.6% (Weatherby et al., 2016). To 
add insult to injury, for those faced with prison time, the main category for violent 
offenders was purely imprisonment, whereas white collar offenders mostly received 
prison with probation (Weatherby et al., 2016). Thus, the overrepresentation of visible 
minorities and the urban poor is a further cue that the white, upper-class is perceived by 
the public as non-threatening, and most importantly, part of the ‘us’. 
It is of utmost importance that white collar crimes be viewed more seriously. This 
cannot be achieved unless there are increased punishments distributed for these crimes, 
prompted by greater public pressure (Rosoff et al., 2020). In order to solicit collective 
force, education is first needed to change the way the public views white collar crime 
(Weatherby et al., 2016). However, Isenring (2008) argues that more educated 
individuals consider white collar offenses less punitively. Therefore, careful attention 
must be paid to ensure that post-secondary courses include more coverage of white collar 
crimes and their harms (Weatherby et al., 2016). Furthermore, Weatherby et al. (2016) 
summarizes the ability of media coverage of major corporate scandals, such as Enron, to 
enlighten and enrage the public, but still argues that it is not enough to gain the 
understanding of the true extent of corporations’ misuse of power.  
Moreover, this is especially important given white collar criminals’ ability to 
escape blame for their crimes, often pointing to their ability to exhibit restraint by not 
having stolen more money (Benson, 1985). Therefore, their attempts should not be taken 
at face value and the public should understand the true extent of their harms. Notably, 
25 
 
gender, age, and political preference do not impact an individual’s perceived seriousness 
of white collar crime (Isenring, 2008). Thus, the reach of white collar crime is 
indiscriminate, and the likelihood of its awareness is equal across all groups.  
2.5.1 The Widespread Consequences of White Collar Money Laundering 
Given the more typically non-violent and discrete operations of white collar crime 
versus organized crime, it is not considered to be as perilous of a threat overall. To 
further highlight the need to treat white collar crimes more seriously, it is necessary to 
examine the breadth of their impacts. The scope of harms caused by white collar crime is 
extensive and widely cited in the literature, especially in regards to the social and 
economic consequences. Nonetheless, it is underexplored relative to the impacts of 
traditional crimes despite its much more profound effect on society (Weatherby et al., 
2016; Pusch & Holtfreter, 2020). As previously discussed, white collar crimes are often 
underexamined because they cannot be linked to specific victims and thus are perceived 
to be victimless; however, their reach is extensive and has detrimental economic effects 
on entire regions (Berghoff & Spiekermann, 2018; Moore & Mills, 1990). In essence, the 
impact of white collar crime should not be underestimated. 
Moreover, white collar crime, including money laundering, harms the most 
vulnerable members of society and exposes them to excessive economic despair and the 
depletion of lifelong savings (Moore & Mills, 1990; Croall, 2009; Berghoff & 
Spiekermann, 2018). With poverty being a pressing issue in even the most developed 
countries in the world, Hansen (2009) emphasizes that white collar crime is costing 
society several times what all conventional crime is combined. It is thus imperative to 
recognize the social harms. 
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Furthermore, financial crimes can devastate the macroeconomy. In particular, 
enduring economic effects can be seen, including loss of income, retirement savings and 
investments, and heightened tax requirements (Brody & Kiehl, 2010; Meeks, 2006). 
Quirk (1997) and the Expert Panel on money laundering in BC real estate (2019) 
similarly highlight the macroeconomic consequences of money laundering, primarily tax 
evasion and the deterrence of legal transactions described as contamination. As well, 
miscalculations of tax, expenses, and resources and inaccurate policy decisions due to 
these errors, as well as diminished confidence in the financial market leading to large 
fluctuations in the demand for funds, interest rates, and exchange rates, are just a few 
more ways in which the macroeconomy is affected by money laundering (Quirk, 1997). 
However, Schneider (2004) argues that money laundering, on one hand, may be 
advantageous to the economy, as it facilitates large investments of funds and a greater tax 
pool. Nonetheless, the Expert Panel on money laundering in BC real estate (2019) 
highlight that the societal costs far outweigh the benefits of any type of financial crime, 
given that a national reputation of relaxed rules on money laundering attracts 
international attention by criminal groups while deterring legitimate investments. 
Moreover, the impact of money laundering specifically is far-reaching and 
substantial (Levi, 2002). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the value 
of money laundering may be as high as 5% of global GDP, nearly $1.5 trillion USD, and 
drug trafficking revenues are said to make up $100 billion USD of this amount annually 
(Singh and Best, 2019; Covlea, 2016). In Canada, the Expert Panel on money laundering 
in BC real estate (2019) similarly estimates money laundering to have been $41.3 billion 
nationally in 2015, and the effect on the province’s real estate market in particular to be 
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around 5%. However, the precise impact of money laundering is nearly impossible to 
accurately measure, and the figures used have only become solidified through repetition, 
yet are riddled with measurement errors (Levi, 2002; Levi, 2014). Nonetheless, Levi 
(2014) and Quirk (1997) argue that social harms may still be highlighted without the use 
of monetary numbers. The Expert Panel on money laundering in BC real estate (2019) 
extends this argument by noting that it is a harm in itself when the rewards of crime are 
greater than legitimate work. Fundamentally, despite debates surrounding the issue of 
empirical measurements of money laundering, it is generally accepted that it has 
substantial consequences to the economy.  
Subsequently, money laundering in the real estate market has specific, related 
consequences. In particular, it may result in heightened competition, corruption of 
industry members, market intimidation and exclusion, losses to investors, and a response 
of greater regulation and policing (Schneider, 2004). More specifically, the impacts of 
mortgage fraud are diverse, including bank losses, damage to personal credit, wasted 
time, increased taxes and mortgage insurance rates, dampened reputation of real estate 
agents and financial institutions, artificial inflation of home prices, and a diminished 
ability to buy and sell real estate in the area (von Lampe, 2008). Municipalities with 
highly leveraged mortgages are likely to steeply rise and fall with the boom and bust of 
the economy (Ben-David, 2011). This is particularly damaging to local economies, given 
that houses are most commonly listed based on comparable properties recently sold in the 
area (Pagourtzi et al., 2003). Thus, fraudulent activities in the real estate market have the 
ability to destroy entire communities’ property values and sale potential. 
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There are also secondary costs that linger in the economy, specifically diminished 
faith in public institutions, leaders, and collective society (Moore & Mills, 1990; Levi, 
2012). Moreover, perceptions of “delegitimation” may arise, namely distrust in the same 
system which is designed to protect society (Moore & Mills, 1990). If trust in public 
welfare is eroded, then the felt need to fend for oneself becomes ever-present, and thus 
more law-breaking behaviour will flourish (Moore & Mills, 1990; Quirk, 1997). 
Moreover, street-level criminals may feel more empowered in their belief that there is a 
class bias and that they are unjustly targeted, again sparking an increase in crime (Moore 
& Mills, 1990). At the heart of it, money laundering puts global prosperity, the reliability 
of financial institutions, and safety at risk (Tellechea, 2008; Singh & Best, 2019). 
Collective morale should be carefully guarded to prevent future crimes and economic 
destruction. 
Clearly, money laundering has both direct and indirect effects on the financial 
economy, social community, and political landscape (Borlini, 2013). In regards to the 
social effects, there is unfortunately a lack of accountability and blame for its fraudulent 
behaviour, and thus victims may suffer immense emotional damage (Levi, 2012). In 
particular, feelings of shame and guilt may arise as realized direct victims experience the 
psychological stress of financial losses (von Lampe, 2008). To boot, the victims are 
largely ignored by the criminal justice system, in favour of protection from victimization 
of conventional crimes (Moore & Mills, 1990). Quirk (1997) suggests that money 
laundering improves individual welfare by sacrificing collective wellbeing, and the 
collective costs to society may be much more substantial than the individual rewards, 
although the severity of harms differs by location and group (Levi, 2014). Importantly, 
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perceptions of the likelihood and seriousness of crimes can represent a social harm in and 
of itself, and should both be kept in mind when making policy decisions (Levi, 2014; 
Levi, 2012). Taken altogether, it is apparent that the risks to society are far greater than 
the risks to the white collar criminal as a money launderer. 
2.6 Amendment of the Opportunity Structure of White Collar Money Laundering 
Despite the adverse effects of white collar crime, it is notoriously difficult to 
detect (Levi, 2014). Simply, “what occurs in the street is more visible and more easily 
investigated than what occurs ‘in the suite’” (Friedrichs, 2010, p. 277). The main 
challenges in identifying white collar crimes are police bias, unreliable self-reports, the 
inapplicability of victim surveys, and a lack of public data (Pusch & Holtfreter, 2020). 
Specifically, the police are trained to focus on street crimes and as such will be more 
drawn to investigate these types of crimes throughout their careers (Friedrichs, 2010). A 
common crime detection method, victim surveys, are not applicable to white collar 
crimes, as a vast proportion of individuals are entirely unaware that they have even been 
victimized which allows offenders to keep under the radar (Braithwaite, 1985). Given the 
wide range of barriers, it is understandable why the public does not view white collar 
crime punitively.  
Furthermore, the range of techniques used for money laundering specifically, 
including non-disclosure of beneficial ownership and smurfing, help to evade scrutiny 
from public authorities. Essentially, money laundering succeeds by outsmarting the 
financial system’s investigative regimes (Levi, 2002). Thus, although there are 
mandatory reporting requirements, such as the suspicious transaction report, stealthy 
criminals find ways around the rules of financial institutions. For example, Sterling 
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(2015) argues that criminal activity can thrive below the $10,000 mandatory reporting 
requirement. Further, given the extremely challenging nature of identifying money 
laundering, Sterling (2015) highlights the usefulness of examining financial transactions 
to identify non-practical business decisions that go against the principles of speed, cost, 
and security, as a method of uncovering criminal funds.  
Firstly, there is a high opportunity cost associated with stagnant funds, and thus 
money left untouched represents a potential sign of money laundering (Sterling, 2015). 
Specifically, Sterling (2015) notes that legitimate businesses use cash to pay down debt 
or invest in capital, so funds left not improving the balance sheet are antithetical to 
common business philosophy and conduct. Secondly, illicit businesses spend additional 
time and fees to perform multiple transactions and create various holding accounts, thus 
increasing costs unnecessarily and as a result, reducing profit. Importantly, while criminal 
activity thrives in the dealings of cash, cash is known to be insecure, with banking 
institutions instead providing a safe place to store and invest funds. When legitimate 
businesses are in a position where they must handle cash, they take extra steps and 
precautions to ensure transparency and leave a clear audit trail of reporting in order to 
protect their revenue, whereas criminal organizations use cash to escape any traceability. 
Thus, large dealings in cash are themselves a red flag for criminal activity, as they stand 
in direct opposition to standard business practices and safeguards. Finally, evidence of 
the source of funds is essentially eliminated by a lack of record keeping.  
Korsell (2018) similarly notes that situational crime prevention uncovers the 
situational factors which enable crime. Financial institutions lack of inquiry into illogical 
bank transactions represents one such situation which facilitates criminal activity. 
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Ultimately, as Milton Friedman (1970) simply puts it, "the business of business is 
business". If profits decrease because of criminal activity (shareholder value, stocks, 
equity, revenue), then the act poses more cost than it does benefit, and thus from a purely 
financial perspective, should be halted. Since white collar money launderers act logically 
and weigh their options strategically, any action which goes against the fundamentals of 
business should immediately trigger suspicion. Therefore, as a strategy to enhance 
detection, using principles which go against common business sense of growing revenues 
at the least cost, delay, and liability possible represents a strong indicator of money 
laundering. 
In order to detect this bizarre business activity, experts have proposed various 
different strategies. Moreover, Kemal’s (2014) findings indicate that there is a significant 
decrease in money laundering when employee training, customer record keeping, and 
suspicious transaction reporting strategies are utilized. However, the accuracy of the 
findings may be questioned given that the unit measurements remain undefined and 
dummy coded reference groups unlabeled. In addition, statistical software can prove 
useful to identify fraudulent activity given the constraint of human capital. Specifically, 
Singh and Best (2019) propose data visualization techniques to illustratively identify 
suspicious transactions using 4 main indicators (selected from the full list provided by 
AUSTRAC): frequent transactions over a limited time frame, transactions whereby the 
same party is both a customer and vendor, movement of funds to less secure countries, 
and loan payments by third parties. Essentially, these measures can be charted and 




Moreover, in cases where a shell or mixed funds company is used in the money 
laundering process, the organizational structure may be optimized to conceal criminal 
intent. Corporations cannot feel the pain of prosecution like an individual can, and thus 
deflecting the crime to the name of the corporation may represent a strategic way for top 
executives to protect themselves (Meeks, 2006). Simply, it is more challenging to 
uncover the intentions behind corporate misconduct compared to individual deviance 
(Albanese, 1984). Similarly, the hierarchy of a company can make it appear as though the 
crimes are taking place at the front-end, whereas in reality, they are masterminded in the 
top suites. Regardless, there is often a disconnect between the top and bottom levels of an 
organization (Braithwaite, 1985). As such, companies can be used to obscure the true 
criminal roots and ownership of funds. 
Regardless of the methods employed, it is clear there is a greater quantity and 
stronger impact of elite criminals than traditional offenders, yet their privileged financial 
position lends itself to increased protections in the criminal justice system, insofar as they 
can afford top lawyers and can bribe relevant officials (Berghoff & Spiekermann, 2018). 
So, even after the rare detection of criminal intent, white collar criminals involved in 
money laundering still benefit from their status and wealth when it comes to subsequent 
actions, including flexible sentencing. Taken altogether, the ability of white collar 
criminals to avoid detection, prosecution, and public disapproval represents an area 
which requires strengthening in the regulatory and legal system in order to increase the 
risks to would-be criminals. 
33 
 
2.6.1 Enhancing the Risks at the Individual Level 
Given the low risks and high rewards of white collar crime, the question should 
not be why some individuals are motivated to offend, but rather, why most are not 
(Braithwaite, 1985; Meeks, 2006). The expert panel on money laundering in BC real 
estate (2019) similarly argues this point by stating that the easier it is to launder money, 
the greater the incentive to do so. White collar criminals are rational actors who take 
opportunities only after calculating the costs and benefits (Berghoff and Spiekermann, 
2018). It is thus imperative to increase the risks associated with financial crime in order 
to deter criminal activity. 
There are several unique deterrents to white collar crime. The main risk factors 
for white collar criminals are fear of imprisonment, wealth and status deterioration, 
public shame, humiliation, and rejection from social circles (Brody and Kiehl, 2010). 
Arguably, publicity of offenses may act as the worst punishment available, as it damages 
their reputations and the stigma greatly impacts upon their families and associations with 
social networks (Benson, 1985). It is not to say that the “fear of falling” from esteemed 
positions directly reduces crime, but rather that it is an intervening variable that reminds 
individuals/businesses of what they stand to lose if they engage in criminal activity and of 
course, get caught (Benson, 1985).  
In addition, there needs to be increased public and political demand for harsher 
sentencing of white collar offenders in order to discourage their deviant behaviour 
(Meeks, 2006). In fact, 63% of respondents from Swiss financial institutions indicated 
that they believed increased sentences would result in less criminal activity (Isenring, 
2008). It has also been found that white collar criminals are more likely to reoffend than 
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violent criminals, partly due to the minimal sentencing they face and favourable terms 
they are offered, such as community service (Weatherby et al., 2016). Therefore, a strong 
mechanism against elite criminal activity is tightening sanctions to increase the fear of 
falling from their esteemed statuses and positions (Piquero, 2012). To this point, 
Braithwaite (1985) insists that any compliance method may be strengthened with the 
addition of criminal punishment. New approaches in the criminal justice system are 
warranted, including punishment equivalent to the harm produced by the crime (Reiman, 
2004).  
Furthermore, the typical white collar offender is not financially constrained as is 
often the case with street-level offenders. Moore and Mills (1990) thus insist that they 
should be required to pay the victim’s damages instead of the government having to 
provide support. This would essentially act as a disincentive to monetary crimes. 
Nonetheless, Moore and Mills (1990) acknowledge that this recommended mandate 
would be met with significant push-back, as stakeholders are resistant to additional 
imposed costs and regulations. However, Weatherby et al. (2016) highlight the 
ineffectiveness of fines and mandated service as deterrents to white collar crime given 
white collar criminals’ greater access to funds and primary interest of protecting their 
status and public image (of which only publicity and criminal sanctioning could put in 
danger).  
Finally, the global reach of white collar crimes poses its own set of challenges. 
Most scholars believe that the greater the distance between the criminal endeavors and 
rewards, the greater the challenge of detecting its activity (Korsell, 2018). However, Levi 
(2014) argues that globalization can actually increase the complexity and limit the 
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capability of organized crime given the fluctuation of investments’ value abroad and the 
need for criminal network partners internationally. It may be that greater international 
coordination is needed to identify, track, and criminalize offenders. Nonetheless, global 
threats to legitimate markets should be carefully monitored. Overall, the risks of 
reputational damage, regulation, imprisonment, and financial losses should be 
strengthened as attempts to reduce criminal activity. 
On the other hand, decreasing the incentives for money laundering is also a useful 
strategy. Since money laundering facilitates the flow of revenues back to the hands of 
criminal organizations, and further, funds future endeavours, sacrificing the financial 
rewards of crimes such as money laundering is key to deterring illegal activities (Borlini, 
2013). Regarding the War on Drugs, the U. S. Department of Treasury similarly 
acknowledges the best way to address the dangers of it is to tackle the profits it generates 
(Tellechea, 2008). The majority of crimes would not be committed if there was no 
financial reward linked to them (Financial Intelligence Unit, 2008). If criminal 
organizations are not able to transfer illicit funds to the legitimate economy, then the 
benefit of committing the crime is essentially eliminated. 
2.6.2 Enhancing the Risks at the Corporate Level 
From a corporate perspective, bad publicity can also be especially detrimental. In 
particular, reputational damage a company can experience from indictment may entirely 
destroy them (Meeks, 2006). Public scandals, such as the repeatedly mentioned Enron 
coverage, evoke feelings of greater societal risk and outcry against corporate 
misbehaviour. If publicity generates public awareness and fear, then this has 
consequences for businesses which may include demands to be more transparent and 
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accountable, reputational damage, and even boycotts. Thus, it represents an important 
risk for businesses to shield against in order to preserve not only their reputation, but also 
the associated shareholder value of the corporation. Overall, increasing the risks of 
consumer backlash can act as a significant deterrent to white collar crime, given that it 
directly results in unfavourable business performance. 
As well, self-regulation may be encouraged through the adoption of industry 
standards. Cherney (2008) notes that fear of market exclusion for not adopting new 
industry practices, including policing partnerships, may serve as an incentive to comply 
with recommendations from regulatory agencies. Fear of industry exclusion may lead 
corporations to adopt crime prevention practices, and this self-regulation may deter 
enforcement and audits (Meeks, 2006). However, organizations who do not fear imposed 
sanctions are more likely to capitalize on the attractive opportunity structures of crime 
(Simpson, 2013). Meeks (2006) cites information asymmetry between investors and 
regulators, and private enterprises as a means for sustained white collar crime, and thus 
increased transparency by corporations is greatly needed, as well as accountability of top 
management and whistleblower protection. This is especially essential given that 
executives who lead by example with deviance encourage malfeasance throughout the 
organization, and foster a corporate climate of profit at any cost (Meeks, 2006). 




2.6.3 Developing Private Sector Partnerships to Better Detect Money Laundering 
To this note, since it is often outside of the range of expertise and resources given 
to police services, it is useful to determine the role of the private sector. There are many 
legitimate businesses and actors who facilitate white collar and organized crime, 
including financial institutions and real estate agencies. Intermediaries play a strong role 
and have immense influence on criminal operations (Griffin, 2002). These intermediary 
actors are considered ‘gatekeepers’ and should be particularly concerned with their 
exposed involvement or facilitation of money laundering, given the need to manage their 
reputation of providing safe and reliable services to the public (Borlini, 2013). Relevant 
stakeholders’ initiative or lack thereof can provide or prevent opportunities for criminal 
activity (Cherney, 2018; Levi, 2014). Ultimately, it is imperative to encourage the private 
sector’s involvement in order to adequately address issues of money laundering. 
Moreover, intermediaries have a unique toolset separate from the police which 
may aid in detection and investigations. Often, the police are not equipped to handle the 
complex intricacies of money launderers, and thus detection efforts fall short (Borlini, 
2013). Putting the creation and execution of anti-money laundering programs in the 
hands of the private sector diminishes the inherent self-interest and capitalizes on their 
access to privately held information (Borlini, 2013). Therefore, collaboration with the 
private sector, particularly financial institutions and intermediaries, is imperative to 
reduce the information silos and improve the system of anti- money laundering efforts. 
There is a plethora of ways to encourage or enforce participation by the private 
sector. Cherney (2008) summarizes the literature on the various methods used to ensure 
third party involvement and compliance, including legislative mandates, formal and 
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informal requests, incentives, legal threats, forming relationships, compulsory record 
keeping and/or registrations, and negative publicity. Regardless of which tactic is 
utilized, extending guardianship can heighten surveillance, require greater efforts by 
perpetrators, and increase the risks while decreasing the rewards, to ultimately deter 
crime (Korsell, 2018). Thus, the institutions which can enable crime are the same 
institutions which can take measures to effectively prevent it by heightening the risk-to-
reward ratio for the criminal organization.  
Third party involvement, specifically financial institutions’ ability to carry out 
macroeconomic policy changes can help to combat money laundering, increase tax 
collection, and restore the faith in and growth of the market (Quirk, 1997). There are a 
variety of synchronies apparent in anti-money laundering efforts. Furthermore, more than 
three-quarters of money laundering incidents use a financial institution (Beare, 2008). 
Thus, Schneider (2004) highlights the principle role of financial institutions in connecting 
the proceeds of crime to the legitimate economy, while denoting the interconnectivity of 
all economic sectors. Financial institutions must be obliged to report suspicious 
behaviour and enforce laws of forfeiture and confiscation of criminal capital (Levi, 
2002). Intensifying the control mechanisms of financial institutions is one upstream 
measure to push back against terrorist financing efforts (Covlea, 2016). In doing so, 
Sterling (2015) argues that bank tellers and marketing departments are best equipped to 
detect money laundering, rather than the technologically advanced software programs 
that have proliferated for this purpose. Clearly, coordination of back and front-end bank 
operations is key to developing systems which both detect and prevent money laundering. 
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A main barrier may arise in the form of the unaware professional; the mortgage 
broker, real estate agent, insurance provider, lawyer, purchaser, and/or seller, among 
others, who may or may not understand their role in the criminal process (von Lampe, 
2008). Nonetheless, these stakeholders represent key points of interception, as criminal 
organizations will utilize industry professionals, specifically bank and real estate agents 
in order to carry out their operations (von Lampe, 2008). Therefore, increased training 
and awareness is necessary on the part of the employer. Financial institutions should also 
be responsible for creating screening and customer maintenance systems which have 
markers for unusual, dangerous activity (Borlini, 2013). 
However, third parties may have a disincentive to intercept criminal structures, as 
they often profit from their exploitation (Cherney, 2018). The shifting responsibility will 
not be without its obstacles, given the high resource demands it places on corporations, 
and thus the public sector should provide guidance and flexibility to jointly achieve the 
objectives set (Borlini, 2013). In addition to having minimal experience with strategic 
crime prevention, businesses are also faced with a monetary burden. Financial institutions 
dislike the costs incurred in implementing anti-money laundering practices and the lack 
of follow-up of results from their efforts (Beare, 2008). In essence, the expectations of 
third parties must be feasible, with consideration of cost and other resource constraints 
(Cherney, 2008). Cherney (2008) further explores the idea of what proportion of the cost 
the third party should be responsible for, and contemplates the notion that they should be 
held accountable for paying a cost relative to the advantage they will receive from the 
crime control. It is imperative that indirect beneficiaries of money laundering in the 
legitimate market be held accountable for their role.  
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2.6.4 FATF Recommendations for Private Sector Stakeholders 
The FATF urges that in order to prevent criminal investment domestically and to 
be accepted by the international community, compliance of the international standards is 
paramount. Further, the FATF applies the full list of recommendations for achieving 
effective anti-money laundering strategies to financial institutions, and several to 
designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), including real estate. 
While there are 40 recommendations specific to money laundering and an additional 9 for 
terrorist financing, the main recommendations of the FATF are to: (1) criminalize money 
laundering; (2) prevent criminal proceeds from reaching the hands of criminals; (3) strict 
enforcement of compliance by financial institutions and DNFBPs to implement measures 
for customer due diligence, record keeping, and suspicious transaction reporting; (4) 
improve overall transparency, and (5) ensure cohesion and coordination domestically and 
internationally. Thus, to ensure compliance of particularly customer due diligence and 
suspicious transaction reporting by financial institutions and real estate members, 
increased regulation is warranted. This is especially evident given that beneficial 
ownership is easily concealed in property purchases through the predominant use of 
nominees and companies. All in all, the FATF guidelines strongly recommend 
partnerships between the public and private sectors (Borlini, 2013). Therefore, real estate 
members should be legally compelled to know their client and work in collaboration with 
financial institutions, mortgage brokers, and insurance agents to ensure accurate 
representation. 
Specific to the real estate sector, concrete action needs to be taken in order to 
prevent the investment of the proceeds of crime. Furthermore, the FATF’s (2016) 
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evaluation of Canada’s anti-money laundering regime found that compared to financial 
institutions, DNFBPs responses are not as effective. In particular, it was noted that, 
“further supervisory efforts are necessary with respect to real estate,” and highlighted the 
necessity of beneficial ownership disclosure (FATF, 2016). There was also a broad 
consensus noted by the Expert Panel on money laundering in BC real estate that 
mandatory disclosure of beneficial ownership is the best tool available to combat money 
laundering operations. That is, beneficial ownership should be identified separately from 
the “legal person” (nominee) or “legal owner” (corporation) to determine the party which 
ultimately exercises control of the investment (Expert Panel, 2019).  
Specifically, beneficial ownership of 10% or more should be mandated for 
disclosure, as well as the provisions to allow federal and regulatory agencies to access 
information and verify the accuracy of the reporting by involved parties (Expert Panel, 
2019). Finally, a registry should be developed at the national level, similar to the Land 
Ownership Transparency Act (LOTA) in BC to ensure displacement is not seen as a by-
product of implementation regionally (Expert Panel, 2019). This would represent a 
paramount step and new benchmark for all countries complying with the FATF’s anti-
money laundering mandates, given that it would be the first beneficial ownership registry 
for land anywhere in the world (Expert Panel, 2019).  
2.6.5 Using Regulation as a Tool to Combat Money Laundering 
In order to ensure third party involvement, regulation is often needed. Crime 
prevention through regulation acknowledges that previous enforcement techniques have 
been inadequate (Meeks, 2006). Further, it has been shown that there is an inverse 
relationship between levels of regulation and crime (Hansen, 2004). In other words, 
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Hansen (2004) observes as regulation is strengthened, crime is diminished. In particular, 
the United Kingdom serves as an example of rising white collar crime and victimization 
where regulation has decreased (Croall, 2009). Specifically, increasing regulation and 
enforcement can reduce money laundering activities, and represents a more effective, 
proactive approach to crime prevention (Borlini, 2013; Freilich & Newman, 2018). 
Predominantly, regulatory frameworks should be used to prevent money laundering from 
flowing through legitimate financial institutions and service operators. 
While recognizing the concentration of crime at places, the operationalization of 
participation by third parties is not necessarily steadfast. Therefore, regulation is a 
proposed tool to encourage collaboration. Specifically, “if a relatively few places 
‘pollute’ crime or disorder, and this pollution is a sizable proportion of all crime and 
disorder, then it makes sense to craft regulatory policies for handling those places” (Eck 
& Eck, 2012, p. 289). There are numerous sectors which require regulation to deter 
financial crimes. Under the federal regulatory process, the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network, bureau of the United States Department of Treasury, assesses real estate 
members, lawyers, and financial service providers as gatekeepers (Tellechea, 2008). As 
such, they are deemed as strong candidates for increased regulation, similar to the Know 
Your Client programs at financial institutions, which make it more difficult for 
individuals to conceal their identity and hide behind company names and accounts 
(Tellechea, 2008; Korsell, 2018).  
Korsell (2018) argues that to strengthen regulatory frameworks, a macro approach 
of situational crime prevention is needed to increase efforts required and risks present, 
and diminish the benefits attached to the crime, “provocations”, and excuses for it. 
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Moreover, risks may be enhanced by identifying critical points of intervention in the 
criminal process, whereby third parties may institute additional measures for safety and 
security (Piquero, 2012). Thus, Eck and Eck (2012) emphasize that regulation should be 
focused on encouraging action to be taken by place managers which would change the 
saliency of opportunities for crime. All in all, private institutions which provide the 
ability to invest and transfer large sums of money are in a prime position to interrupt the 
criminal process. 
Overall, when evaluating whether a means (method) or ends (outcome) based 
regulatory instrument should be used, it is necessary to consider its effectiveness (crime 
reduction), efficiency (cost reduction), equity (fair cost distribution to proprietors), and 
side effects (Eck & Eck, 2012). Ends-based regulation can encourage businesses to 
design measures which are most effective to crime control (Tilley, 2012). Thereafter, 
means-based regulation can be enforced using the strategies developed in the term of 
ends-based regulation (Tilley, 2012). A prominent argument nonetheless exists that 
effective strategies may be leveraged as a competitive advantage rather than shared with 
industry partners (Tilley, 2012). Similarly, while self-regulation may have the economic 
advantage, it should be followed up with external pressures and check-ins to maximize 
effectiveness (Friedrichs, 2010). Self-regulation may be preferred by businesses for its 
ability to avoid increased regulation imposed by the government and to shield itself from 
public scrutiny (Tyler, 2009). Where self-regulation may be used as a tactic to deter 
further government-imposed regulation, it is also important to recognize that ‘window 
dressing’, in which a company appears to enforce new practices yet are insubstantial, 
may be detrimental to preventative models (Meeks, 2006). Regardless of which 
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regulatory approach is utilized, where regulation is imposed on private institutions, it will 
be met with push-back given the additional costs and market disruption (Tilley, 2012). It 
nonetheless should be strictly enforced on third parties to interrupt the process of money 
laundering. 
2.6.6 Challenges to Implementing or Strengthening Regulation 
However, the criminal justice system does not commonly use regulation to 
address crime, and thus strategies for proactive policing are not given sufficient resources 
when compared to conventional, reactive approaches (Eck & Eck, 2012; Webster, 2015). 
In particular, it is evident that “manipulating the conditions in which choices to commit 
crime are liable to be made is an underexplored and underused public policy and that a 
key to its implementation is to persuade those inadvertently creating crime opportunities 
to reduce them” (Tilley, 2012, p. 375). The lack of attention by policy makers is 
particularly evident at places, whereby the discussion of blocking opportunities is rarely 
addressed (Eck & Eck, 2012). Moreover, preventative regulation is not without its 
challenges (Meeks, 2006). Primarily, it comes at a high cost, and has unintended 
consequences for already law-abiding companies in the targeted industries, including 
diminished cash resources which may affect connected stakeholders as well (Meeks, 
2006). In fact, any approach to regulation is costly and time-consuming to both 
implement and maintain (Tellechea, 2008). Borlini (2013) extends this argument by 
noting that increased costs for corporations also means increased costs for the 
government and reduced privacy for society. However, it should be noted that there is 
already an ever-present invasion of privacy as it stands, with the proliferation of “smart” 
devices, and as such, the impact on privacy of anti-money laundering efforts would be 
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only minimal, if felt at all. Nonetheless, Freilich and Newman (2018) pose the question 
of whether intervention of the private sector in policing changes societal views on the 
ability of traditional policing to protect our rights and safety. 
As well, the relationship between companies and government plays a substantial 
role in the regulations which are enforced. Bittle et al. (2013) challenge the 
individualistic society and interconnectedness of the Canadian government and private 
businesses which discourages regulation insofar as there is a heightened likelihood of 
conflict of interest. The government sets a low priority agenda for fraud; however, it may 
be best dealt with in collaboration with parties outside of the formal police service (Levi, 
2012). Levi (2012) urges governmental bodies and private institutions to increase 
sanctions to ensure compliance and guard against conflict of interest. Similarly, larger 
corporations are treated more favourably because they are considered more vital to the 
economy and less likely to be negatively impacted by any punishment (Meeks, 2006). 
Governments may restrict imposing greater scrutiny to powerful multinational 
corporations in fear that they will ‘kill’ big business (Meeks, 2006).  
Additionally, regulation aims to put an end to current problems, but largely fails 
to consider new opportunities that the changes may create (Korsell, 2018). Simply, 
capitalizing on the regulatory framework is a common tactic for organized crime groups 
(Korsell, 2018). Braithwaite (2019) explains that policy and regulation often fail to take 
account of their impact on crime, and further, argues for an interdisciplinary approach to 
traditionally purely criminological pursuits, pointing to international relations as an 
essential discipline for collaboration. Finally, the extremity of the sanction for non-
compliance or transgressions to regulations should be based on the magnitude of harm, 
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not the amount of private benefit (Shavell, 1985). The aforementioned outcomes 
underscore the importance of preventative methods, to prevent damage to the economy 
which is inherent in money laundering.  
2.7 Gaps in the Literature and Contribution 
There remains a disproportionate research focus on crimes of the lower class, and 
thus white collar crime is still significantly understudied (Griffin, 2002; Pusch & 
Holtfreter, 2020). In particular, crimes of the elite have been underexplored in the 
Canadian landscape, a nation which offers favourable court proceedings for corporate 
wrongdoers (Bittle et al., 2018). Turning a blind eye to crimes of the upper class can 
prove detrimental to the economy, especially when faith in the financial market and legal 
system is destroyed. It can also increase the difficulty of preparing budget and spend 
forecasts for government officials when the effects of white collar crime are largely 
ignored (Quirk, 1997).  
Moreover, data used for criminal analysis and policy-making may be inherently 
flawed due to the exclusion of acts which are not criminally convicted (Griffin, 2002). 
Therefore, if we wish to better inform policy decisions, more research attention needs to 
be focused on white collar crime, but this seems an unlikely achievement given the long 
history of failing to criminalize the most powerful fraudsters (Barak, 2013). In particular, 
valid measures of fraud in nearly every country are extremely unreliable, and thus 
international estimates of money laundering have a weak empirical footing (Levi, 2012). 
Furthermore, white collar money laundering is indicative of their ability to manipulate 
markets and leverage their financial privilege and status to secure investments. This point 
is especially noteworthy given the substantial under-study of the investment of the 
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proceeds of white collar crime, derived from fraudulent business activities, into the 
Canadian real estate market. 
Overall, little criminological research has been conducted on, and policy attention 
given to, the ease with which illegal money is invested in Canada’s real estate market. 
This is particularly relevant given that the placement of illicit funds into Canadian 
property ownership poses several risks for the Canadian economy at large, namely 
inflated home prices and increased criminal activity. Specifically, as home prices 
continue to increase and more and more citizens are pushed out of the housing market, 
the investigation of money laundering becomes paramount. Added to this is that money 
laundering is used as a way to clean dirty money, of which maintains the financial 
success of white collar criminals, and is then funneled into residential property purchases. 
Furthermore, it is evident that the real estate market has not commonly been 
viewed through a criminological lens. Instead, it has mostly been examined from an 
economic and financial perspective, looking particularly at rising house prices, inflation, 
leverage, and lending rates, and less commonly, migration. Moreover, the real estate 
industry is centered in a grey area of the regulatory framework which enables criminal 
activity to thrive. Therefore, intersectionality of research disciplines, predominantly 
economics and criminology, is necessary to create effective policies. To this point, 
critical points for enhanced regulation with third parties in the real estate market, to 
prevent money laundering and mortgage fraud, represent a significant gap in the 
criminological literature. Nonetheless, regulation as a strategy to address crime, and 
particularly to block opportunities at places and extend guardianship, is rarely considered 
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(Eck & Eck, 2012). In addition, the types of regulation and enforcement mechanisms also 
require further attention, with specific regard to the issues present in self-regulation.  
Subsequently, the extended effects of white collar crime at the community level are 
under-examined in the literature (Becker et al., 2000). While it is widely agreed upon that 
precise measures of the economic impact of crimes of the upper-class is unattainable, 
there has been little effort to uncover the spillover effects in the local regions. The 
common buzzwords of diminished confidence in the market and public institutions, 
damaged collective morale, heightened psychological stress, and breeding increased 
deviance are frequently used, but there does not appear to be any concrete effort to move 
beyond these buzzwords. Similarly, there is a clear focus of many researchers on 
gathering the public’s perception regarding the seriousness of white collar crime, but 
there is no extension to display its impacts.  
The contribution of the thesis is to help close the gap with respect to identifying 
meaningful shortcomings of Canadian real estate anti-money laundering activities and its 
effects on the market. Moreover, this study aligns with Kilduff (2006), who notes that, 
“the route to good theory leads not through the gaps in the literature but through 
engagement with problems in the real world” (p. 252). To this end, the thesis addresses 
the following research questions: (1) Does financial transaction reporting increase home 
prices?; (2) Does suspicious transaction reporting in the real estate sector decrease home 
prices?; and (3) Does strengthening financial transaction reporting generally, and 
suspicious transaction reporting specifically, improve home ownership affordability? 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Added to the already troublesome effort to detect financial crime in general terms, 
the literature review summarizes that money laundering thrives in the real estate market 
due to a lack of regulation specifically surrounding beneficial ownership. It further 
synthesizes the harms as psychological and financial, both on a micro (individual) and 
macro (collective) level. However, estimations of money laundering have been criticized 
for a lack of empirical grounding, and thus there remains a lack of research on . 
Therefore, the hypotheses listed below help fill this void by empirically examining the 
impact of money laundering on the community, as it relates to challenges of home 
ownership specifically. 
3.1 Hypotheses 
Based on the current position of the literature on the impact of money laundering, 
the following hypotheses paralleled to the above aforementioned research questions, have 
been developed: 
H1. Rising FINTRAC financial transaction reporting increases home prices. 
H2. Rising suspicious transaction reporting in the real estate sector decreases home 
prices.  
H3. Stronger financial transaction reporting generally, and suspicious transaction 
reporting specifically, improves home ownership affordability. 
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3.2 Sample Description and Collection Process 
The data examined in this thesis draws on several datasets, including the MLS 
Home Price Index, FINTRAC financial transaction reporting data, and Statistics 
Canada’s Canadian Income Survey. Each are elaborated on in this section.  
First, the MLS Home Price Index measures “home price levels and trends” 
through information provided by 19 real estate boards across Canada. It covers 
approximately two-thirds of Canadian real estate activity, including the regions of 
Calgary, Fraser Valley, Greater Montreal, Greater Vancouver, Greater Toronto, Regina, 
Saskatoon, Ottawa, Vancouver Island, Victoria, Greater Moncton, Guelph, Oakville-
Milton, Edmonton, Barrie & District, Hamilton-Burlington, Niagara Region, Okanagan 
Valley, and Winnipeg. The dataset includes information on the house price index (HPI) 
and benchmark price for a single family, one-story, two-story, townhouse, and apartment 
style homes, as well as the composite measurements by month and region between 
January 2005 and December 2018. The house price index (HPI) is calculated as a 
percentage change from January 2005, of which the base/reference period’s HPI is equal 
to 100. Therefore, if the composite HPI was 150 in January 2007, for example, then 
prices for all Canadian housing type are 50% higher than they were in January 2005. 
Next, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada 
(FINTRAC) is the Canadian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) which aims to identify and 
prevent money laundering and financing of terrorist acts. FINTRAC operates separate 
from other public safety agencies under the Proceeds of Crime Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA), and relays its findings to the Minister of Finance. 
The dataset includes information on the frequency of reports by type, the sector to which 
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the entity belongs, the reporting month, fiscal year, and geographic location using the 
first 3 digits of the postal code and national coverage. The activity sectors include 
accountants, banks, British Columbia notaries, casinos, credit unions, dealers in precious 
metals and stones, life insurance, money services businesses, real estate, securities 
dealers, and trust and loan companies. Importantly, the report types are suspicious 
transaction reports (STRs), large cash transaction reports (LCTRs), electronic fund 
transfers (EFTs), and casino disbursement reports (CDRs).  
STRs must be submitted to FINTRAC when there is, at minimum, “reasonable 
grounds to suspect” money laundering or terrorist financing based on an evaluation of 
“facts, context, and indicators”. This evaluation ultimately aims to differentiate between 
legitimate and illegitimate market activity. To do so, contextualization is particularly 
relevant as it relates to a general understanding of business activities and transactions, 
knowledge of customers’ background and details, and how it connects to the overarching 
Know-Your-Client (KYC) principles. There is no minimum monetary value for filing a 
suspicious transaction report. On the other hand, LCTRs, EFTs, and CDRs all use a 
minimum $10,000 threshold within 24 hours to mandate reporting. Specifically, LCTRs 
are required when this amount is received, EFTs are required when this amount is 
transferred into or out of Canada, and CDRs are required when this amount is disbursed 
to the same individual. The reporting period covers April 2011 to December 2018. 
FINTRAC is bound by law to anonymize all data collected.  
Finally, Statistics Canada provides data on the “Income of individuals by age 
group, sex and income source, Canada, provinces and selected census metropolitan 
areas.” This information is drawn from the Canadian Income Survey (CIS), an annual, 
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national survey by Statistics Canada. The sample consists of 56,000 households from the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) through probabilistic, stratified, multi-stage selection 
techniques. The LFS is distributed through complex random sampling. Participation in 
the CIS is voluntary. Interviews are conducted over the phone or in person, while other 
eligible candidates are offered to complete the online survey. One member of each 
household is designated as the knowledge representative for cost purposes. The CIS is 
ultimately a cross-sectional survey, which is combined with the LFS and tax data from 
the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). 
There are 6 and 8 independent samples, also referred to as rotation groups, of the 
Labour Force Survey in Canadian provinces and territories respectively. Each provincial 
group progresses through the survey over 6 months. The 2018 Canadian Income Survey 
used in this thesis draws on provincial rotation groups ending in the months of January to 
June 2019 and all territorial dwelling groups. Therefore, the data collection period is 
between January 1, 2019 and July 2, 2019. 
3.3 Empirical Analysis and Data 
3.3.1 Data and Hypotheses Operationalization: Hypotheses 1 and 2 
The MLS and FINTRAC datasets were filtered to only look at the 
national/aggregate data points. As well, they were sorted by month-year with missing 
time periods in national FINTRAC data being replaced with zeros, given the lack of 
reports received during these intervals. The timeline used was April 2011 to December 
2018 since this was the shared timespan by both datasets. Thus, the sample size is 93 
months with no missing responses for any of the variables. The data from MLS and 
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FINTRAC was thus combined hinging on the month-year. The key variables included 
from MLS were “composite hpi”, and subsequently the HPI for each dwelling type: 
“single family”, “one storey”, “two storey”, “townhouse”, and “apartment”. The variables 
included from FINTRAC were the national “number of all financial reports for all 
activity sectors”, “number of suspicious transaction reports for all activity sectors”, 
“number of all financial reports for real estate sector”, and “number of suspicious 
transaction reports for real estate sector”. 
First, univariate statistics for each of the above-listed scaled variables was run in 
SPSS. Specifically, frequency tables with measures of central tendency (mean and 
median), measures of dispersion (standard deviation, variance, range, minimum, and 
maximum values), kurtosis, and skewness were included, as well as histograms with the 
normal curve. This highlights the frequencies, trends, and patterns of each variable. 
Univariate statistics is especially useful because it shows if the requirements (i.e., 
normality) are met before proceeding to more advanced, inferential statistical tests. The 
frequency tables and distributions also illuminate the raw number of reports filed which 
is useful in and of itself to understand the extent, or lack thereof, of financial transaction 
reporting by financial institutions and designated non-financial business and professions 
(DNFBPs). As well, time-series graphs were created for the FINTRAC variables to show 
their trends and patterns over the 93-month period. 
Next, recoding of the scaled variables from FINTRAC was completed in Excel. 
The scaled variables were recoded to be nominal dichotomous variables, split based on 
their median values. The lower range (below median) was labelled “low”, and the higher 
range (above median) was labelled “high”. The decision to create dichotomous 
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independent variables for level of reporting was based on the need to ensure sample size 
adequacy for each level. In particular, the range for suspicious transaction reports per 
month is low, and thus splitting into more than 2 groups for the purpose of analysis was 
not feasible. Therefore, the number of reports received variables were transformed from 
continuous numerical variables (raw number of transactions per month) to nominal 
dichotomous categorical variables (level/extent of volume of transactions per month).  
Finally, given the limitation of recoding, one-tailed independent-samples t-tests 
were run in SPSS using “composite HPI” as the dependent variable and the recoded 
levels of national financial and suspicious transaction reports as the independent 
variables. This was performed to assess: H1) the relationship between the level of 
financial transaction reporting in all sectors with respect to composite HPI; and H2) the 
relationship between the level of suspicious transaction reporting specifically in the real 
estate sector with respect to composite HPI. Moreover, the 2 independent samples t-tests 
for hypotheses 1 and 2 respectively identify if significant average differences exist (and 
the amount of difference) between the 2 levels of reporting with respect to national home 
prices at the .001 significance level, to ultimately inform policy decisions. Homogeneity 
of variances was also accounted for, using the appropriate t-statistic based on the 
Levene’s test. 
Thereafter, independent samples t-tests were run for the 2 independent variables 
of level of financial transaction reporting in all sectors and the level of suspicious 
transaction reporting in the real estate sector with the dependent variable replacing 
composite HPI, instead using each dwelling type (single family, one storey, two storey, 
townhouse, and apartment). Ultimately, this technique tested if money laundering 
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increases home prices across the board, using financial reporting methods (H1: all 
financial transaction reports; and H2) suspicious transaction reports in real estate) as a 
proxy measure. 
Additionally, the correlation coefficients for composite HPI and financial 
transaction reporting, and composite HPI and suspicious transaction reporting in real 
estate were calculated using Excel. The purpose of the correlation coefficients is to 
determine if there is an association between the pair of variables, and if so, the direction 
and strength of the correlation. This aids in approximating the behaviour of housing 
prices based on the extent of reporting.  
3.3.2 Data and Hypotheses Operationalization: Hypothesis 3 
The MLS, FINTRAC, and CIS data sets were used to compute the growth rates of 
the composite home price index, national financial transaction reporting for all activity 
sectors, national suspicious transaction reporting for all activity sectors, and median 
income respectively. Specifically, 2012 was used as the first year for comparison, given 
that it was the first full year of reporting shared by the 2 datasets. For the national 
financial transaction reporting and national suspicious transaction reporting variables, the 
medians were calculated for each year. For the composite HPI, the annual median was 
also calculated. The yearly growth rates were computed by dividing the current year’s 
figure by the previous year’s figure and subtracting 1.  
Annual growth rates were necessary because the median income figures were 
provided in a yearly format. As well, it highlights the big picture trends and changes of 
the data, a goal which is inherent to the nature of the graph being time-series. The 
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decision to use the annual growth rate comparison method was similarly made to look at 
the overall trajectories of the key variables. Therefore, the growth rates were plotted from 
2013 to 2018, and the comparative analysis was performed, looking at interactions 
amongst the growth rates of composite HPI, national STRs, and income during this time 
period. This ultimately showcased the fluctuations in affordability of home ownership 
and the potential effect of financial transaction reporting on this relationship. The 4 
trendlines were plotted in the graph , with x as year and y as the growth rate with labelled 
percentage intervals of 5. Finally, as in the analysis for hypotheses 1 and 2, the 
correlation coefficients were calculated for each pair of variables. Most importantly, the 
correlation coefficients between income and all other variables were used to determine 
the strongest association.  
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
4.1 Univariate Statistics 
4.1.1 Composite HPI 
The comparison (base) point for house price index is 100 (January 2005). The 
average composite home price index is 185.368 with midpoint 173.3. This means that on 
average, Canadian home prices were approximately 85% higher than they were in the 
reference period, January 2005. Therefore, half of the months in the sample had 
composite home price indexes higher than 173.3 and half had lower. Only one-quarter of 
months had scores higher than 215.05. Of note, there is no repetition of composite HPI 
throughout the 93 months, indicating there is consistent fluctuations in Canadian real 
estate prices. The standard deviation is relatively low at 30.6518. The kurtosis statistic is 
-1.309 and the skewness statistic is .517. Thus, the distribution has light tails and is
platykurtic, slightly outside of the acceptable variation for normality. As well, the 
distribution has a slight positive skew, with a longer right tail indicating a few extremely 
high scores. Nonetheless, the distribution was deemed acceptable and not adjusted in 
order to look at the full range of home prices, including the natural variation and extreme 
scores. 
4.1.2 Number of All Financial Reports for All Activity Sectors 
The average number of monthly financial reports of all types and for all activity 
sectors is 1,873,582.48. The midpoint of the distribution is 1,790,491, suggesting that 
half of all months had more than this amount of reports and half had less. The mean 
distance of values from the mean is 276,291.941, demonstrating relatively little variance. 
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Overall, throughout the 93 months surveyed, the frequency of financial reports is never 
duplicated. Three-quarters of the months had less than 2,081,772.50 reports, while the 
highest reported number of reports in a single month is 2,675,006. As displayed in Figure 
4.0, there is an upwards trajectory of Canadian financial transaction reporting. In April 
2011, 1,423,089 financial reports were submitted across all sectors, increasing steadily in 
frequency upto the last month of December 2018 when 2,367,126 were completed (see 
Figure 4.0). Overall, this data suggests that the frequency of all financial transaction 
reports monthly is very high. Further analysis, as demonstrated in the coming sections, is 
needed to explore the utilization and role of the various report types. 


















































































































4.1.3 Number of Suspicious Transaction Reports for All Activity Sectors 
The mean number of suspicious transaction reports for all activity sectors is 
9,772.04 per month. The median is 8,523 indicating that half of the 93 months had more 
than 8,523 total suspicious transaction reports and half had less. The standard deviation 
of the distribution is 4,198.727 thus suggesting a moderately high degree of dispersion. 
The highest number of suspicious transaction reports for all activity sectors is 23,307 in a 
month, whereas the low is 5,137 in a month, equating to a total range of 18,170. Overall, 
only one-quarter of the months received more than 11,106 suspicious transaction reports. 
This shows that it is the exception rather than the common occurrence for suspicious 
transaction reports to amount to more than 11,106 in a one-month timespan. Similar to 
the number of all report types for all activity sectors, each period had a unique frequency 
of reports, illustrating significant variation in the extent of suspicious transaction 
reporting by month. 
4.1.4 Number of All Financial Reports for Real Estate Sector 
The average number of all financial report types in the real estate sector is close to 
6 (5.90) per month. The midpoint of the distribution is 5, demonstrating that half of the 
months had more than 5 reports in the real estate sector and half had less. The standard 
deviation is 4.597, suggesting a significantly large spread in the distribution of scores 
from the mean. Specifically, monthly financial transaction reports for the real estate 
sector amounting to between 1 and 9 re-occur more frequently than those amounts 10 to 
21. The greatest reported number of financial transaction reports from the real estate 
sector in a one-month period was 21, whereas other months had no reports at all. This 
means, at most, for all of Canada and all applicable report types (LCTR, EFT, and STR), 
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only 21 reports were filed in a one-month period related to the real estate sector. 
Moreover, suspicious transaction reports and large cash transaction reports comprised the 
large majority of report types for the real estate sector, with only 1 electronic funds 
transfer reported and no casino disbursement reports. Overall, only 21.5% of all months 
experienced more than 8 reports. Altogether, the finding of such low overall financial 
reporting for real estate transactions is concerning. 
4.1.5 Number of Suspicious Transaction Reports for Real Estate Sector 
The mean number of suspicious transaction reports in the real estate sector is 4.39 
per month. The median is 3, indicating that half of all months had more than 3 and half 
had less than 3 suspicious transaction reports. The standard deviation is quite high at 
4.494, and the range is 18 suspicious transaction reports at the highest and none at the 
lowest. However, 75% of the months had less than 6 suspicious transaction reports. Most 
commonly, there is only 1 suspicious transaction report; 19 of the 93 months had only 1 
suspicious transaction report (11.8%). Secondly, there were 15 months which had only 2 
suspicious transaction reports, and 11 months with no suspicious transaction reports at 
all.  
As shown in Figure 4.1, at the beginning of the period in April 2011, only 4 
suspicious transaction reports were filed from the real estate sector, and at the end of the 
period in December 2018, still only 6 were documented (see Figure 4.1). Therefore, 
while there were visible fluctuations throughout the 7 years analyzed, significant 
improvements were not noticeable. The overall lack of suspicious transaction reports 
related to real estate is alarming, and indicative of its disintegration with the Proceeds of 
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Crime Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act PCMLTFA’s recommendations 
for the real estate sector as a designated non-financial business and profession (DNFBP). 
Figure 4.1 FINTRAC Suspicious Transaction Reporting in Canadian Real Estate 
(April 2011 to Dec 2018) 
4.1.6 Number of Large Cash Transaction Reports & Electronic Fund Transfers for Real 
Estate Sector 
The average number of large cash transaction reports in the real estate sector is 
1.51, with the midpoint as 1. Overall, roughly three-quarters of the months had less than 
2 large cash transaction reports. Predominantly, 28% of months had only 1 large cash 
transaction report, 26.9% of months had no large cash transaction reports, and 22.6% of 
months had 2 large cash transaction reports. The standard deviation indicated a large 
amount of spread, at 1.307. In summary, it is evident that large cash transaction reports 
represent a minority of financial reports submitted from the real estate sector. Similarly, 





















































































































filed from the real estate sector, in June 2018. Taken altogether, it is strikingly apparent 
from the ability to count on one hand the number of LCTRs and EFTs submitted for all of 
Canada in each 1-month timeframe, that the real estate industry is not adequately 
participating in anti-money laundering practices. 
Table 4.0 Frequencies and Proportions of Relevant FINTRAC Reports by Sector 
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4. 2 Inferential Statistics
4.2.1 Hypothesis 1: Rising financial transaction reporting increases home prices 
Research Question: Is there a significant mean difference in the composite home price 
index (DV) between levels of national FINTRAC financial transaction reporting (IV)? 
Using the level of Canadian aggregate financial transaction reporting (STRs, 
LCTRs, EFTs, and CDRs) as a proxy measure of financial crimes, the research 
hypothesis assumes the market reflection to be increased home prices. This is due to the 
predicted infiltration of criminal funds into the real estate sector, thus artificially inflating 
home prices. The results found that the mean composite home price index for the low 
reporting level is 159.59, and for the high reporting level is 210.245 with sample sizes of 
46 and 47 months respectively. This means that in comparison to the reference period of 
January 2005, months with a higher level of financial reporting had home prices 110% 
higher, and months with a lower level of financial reporting had approximately 56% 
housing prices. The HPI differences between the low and high financial transaction 
reporting levels are markedly spread apart, indicating that as crime rises (measured by the 
level of financial transaction reporting across all industries), home prices rise in parallel. 
The Levene’s test of equality of variance is statistically significant (F=64.278, .000, 
p<.001), thus equal variances are not assumed. The corresponding t-statistic is -14.032 
with significance .000 (p<.001), therefore demonstrating that there is a significant 
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average difference of 50.2947 in the composite home price index between the low and 
high levels of reporting (see Table 4.1). Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected given 
the findings that the composite home price index was greater when the frequency of 
financial transaction reporting was ‘high’. 
Additionally, significance was found (.000, p<.001) between the level of financial 
transaction reporting in all sectors and each dwelling type (single family, one storey, two 
storey, townhouse, and apartment). Similarly, the average HPI for each type was greater 
for the ‘high’ level of reporting compared to the ‘low’ level. The greatest mean difference 
(55.70) observed was for the two-storey dwelling type, whereas the minimum mean 
difference in HPI (45.68) was found for apartments, highlighting an approximately 10% 
difference between the two. Therefore, it can be noted that the most substantial pricing 
differences between the low and high levels of reporting is in relation to property 
expensiveness (i.e., significant average differences reported for: (1) two storey= 55.70, 
(2) single family= 51.92, (3) townhouse= 49.59, (4) one storey= 46.04, and (5) 
apartment= 45.68). There is also a very strong, positive correlation between financial 
transaction reporting (not recoded) and composite HPI (r=0.88, p=unknown). In 
summary, it is discernible that overall, as financial transaction reporting increases, home 
prices increase regardless of housing type. This is because with transaction reporting used 
as a proxy measure for financial crimes, it is understandable that as financial crime rises, 
home prices will also rise. This is particularly justified given that money laundering 
allows illicit funds to enter the legitimate economy, thus increasing market competition 
and artificially inflating home prices. 
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4.2.3 Hypothesis 2: Rising suspicious transaction reporting in the real estate sector 
decreases home prices 
Research Question: Is there a significant mean difference in the composite home price 
index between levels of national suspicious transaction reporting in the real estate sector? 
Using the level of Canadian suspicious transaction reports in the real estate sector 
as a measure of money laundering intervention, the research hypothesis assumes a 
positive effect on home prices. Specifically, higher levels of STRs for real estate are 
predicted to improve home ownership affordability measured by a reduction in composite 
HPI. Moreover, the findings suggest that the mean composite home price index for the 
low reporting level is 166.153, and for the high reporting level is 203.381 with sample 
sizes of 45 and 48 months respectively. This means that for months with a high level of 
STRs filed by the real estate industry, home prices were 103% higher than the reference 
period of January 2005, and for months with a low level, home prices were 66% higher. 
The Levene’s test of equality of variance is statistically significant (F=36.342, .000, 
p<.001), thus equal variances are not assumed. The t-statistic is -7.491 with significance 
.000 (p<.001), therefore demonstrating that there is a significant average difference of 
37.2279 in the composite home price index between the low and high levels of suspicious 
transaction reporting in the real estate sector (see Table 4.1). However, the null 
hypothesis was not rejected given the increased composite HPI for higher levels of 
suspicious transaction reporting in the real estate sector. Moreover, the inverse 
relationship which was expected was not found. 
Additionally, for the dwelling types of single family, one storey, two storey, 
townhouse, and apartment, significance was found (.000, p<.001) between the level of 
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suspicious transaction reporting in the real estate sector. Similarly, the average HPI for 
each type was greater for the ‘high’ level of reporting compared to the ‘low’ level. As 
was the case in H1, two-storey dwellings experienced the largest average difference in 
HPI (40.09). The minimum mean difference in HPI was found for one-storey dwellings 
(33.42), followed by apartments (36.42), single family homes (37.49), and townhouses 
(37.50). Additionally, there is a strong, positive correlation between suspicious 
transaction reporting in real estate (not recoded) and composite HPI (r=0.73, 
p=unknown). Moreover, the trend from H1 repeats in that the largest pricing differences 
found in the t-tests existed for the more expensive property types. However, the 
maximum average pricing difference between levels of suspicious transaction reporting 
in the real estate sector is 40.09, whereas between levels of financial transaction reporting 
in all sectors it is 55.70 with the minimum being 45.68. This highlights that the 
differences in HPI are more affected by the latter variable. Further analysis is warranted 
to determine the use of real estate-related reporting. 
In summary, suspicious transaction reporting in the real estate sector was 
expected to negate the negative effects of money laundering on home prices. However, it 
was found that, similar to the results of H1, as reporting increased, so did home prices. 
Since the null hypothesis was not disproved, further investigation is warranted. In 
particular, the proportion of suspicious transaction reports which comprises the total 
financial transaction reporting figure, the proportion of real estate-specific suspicious 
transaction reports which comprise the total suspicious transaction reports, and the 
proportion of suspicious transaction reports which comprise the total financial transaction 
reports in the real estate sector, require examination. 
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Firstly, 0.52% of all financial transaction reports are suspicious transaction 
reports. Secondly, only 0.04% of all suspicious transaction reports occur in the real estate 
sector. Similarly, a mere 0.0003% of all financial transaction reports pertain to real estate. 
Finally, 74.32% of all financial transaction reports in the real estate sector are suspicious 
transaction reports (see Table 4.0). Yet, looking at the monthly frequencies of suspicious 
transactions in the real estate sector itself, averaging at only approximately 4 per month 
on a national level, it is clear that greater action is needed in this sector. Added to this is 
the fact that within the real estate sector, suspicious transaction reports are the most 
frequently used tool, representing just under three-quarters of all reports. As well, slightly 
over half a percentage point of all financial transaction reports are STRs, and similarly, 
less than one-twentieth of a percentage point of all suspicious transaction reports are in 
the real estate sector.   
Thus, two outcomes are apparent: (1) suspicious transaction reporting is an 
underutilized tool regardless of economic sector, and (2) the use of suspicious transaction 
reporting in the real estate sector is grossly underemployed despite being the most 
commonly used financial report in the sector. Specifically, increased targeted measures in 
the form of greater STR activity in real estate is needed. This is especially relevant given 
that more reports would capture a larger portion of the crime committed, but it is likely 
that a much darker figure would still loom. These findings may also be indicative of why 
financial transaction reporting more strongly influences differences in HPI. Thus, despite 
failing to reject the null hypothesis, it has illuminated the underlying issue of an overall 
lack of real estate participation in anti-money laundering efforts and suspicious 
transaction reporting broadly.  
 
68 










Composite HPI by 
Reporting Level of 
Independent 
Variable 














37.28 Low= 166.15 
High= 203.38 
4.2.3 Hypothesis 3: Stronger financial transaction reporting generally, and suspicious 
transaction reporting specifically, improves home ownership affordability. 
Research Question: Is affordability of home ownership weakening due to financial and 
suspicious transaction reporting levels? 
It can be seen that there is an inverse relationship between the growth rates of 
suspicious transaction reporting and the composite home price index, and similarly 
between the growth rates of financial transaction reporting and the composite house price 
index (see Figure 4.2). That is, predominantly, as suspicious transaction reporting and 
financial transaction reporting increases, the composite home price index decreases, and 
vice-versa. As well, there is an observable inverse relationship between the rate of change 
of financial transaction reporting and income.  
To verify the visible relationships, correlation coefficients are useful. As shown in 
Table 4.2, there is a weak negative relationship between financial transaction reporting 
69 
 
and composite HPI (r=-0.08), and between suspicious transaction reporting and 
composite HPI (r=-0.16). There is a strong negative correlation between financial 
transaction reporting and income (r=-0.76), therefore indicating that as financial 
transaction reporting increases in frequency, income decreases. This can potentially be 
explained by proxying financial crime with financial transaction reporting, whereby as 
there is greater criminal activity in the economy, the viability of legitimate work is 
diminished. Consequently, with less access to funds, entrance into the real estate market 
is also sacrificed.  
Moreover, there is only 1 positive moderate relationship, which is between 
financial transaction reporting and suspicious transaction reporting (r=0.38). This is 
understandable given that financial transaction reporting includes suspicious transaction 
reporting, of which suspicious transaction reporting makes up a minority of all financial 
transaction reports (noted in the descriptive statistics section above). Finally, all other 
associations are positive and weak. However, it must be noted that as with hypotheses 1 
and 2, since the correlation coefficients were computed in Excel, statistical significance 
cannot be calculated, and thus represents a limitation of the analysis. 
The greatest growth rate on a year-to-year basis is observed for suspicious 
transaction reporting, followed by the composite home price index, and finally, median 
income. Specifically, the percentage change on an annual basis ranges from -0.37% to 
12.60% for financial transaction reporting, 1.20% to 29.28% for suspicious transaction 
reporting, 2.41% to 13.39% for the composite home price index, and -0.86% to 2.58% for 
income. Therefore, the median income between 2013 and 2018 remained relatively 
stable, while there were moderate fluctuations in the median financial transaction 
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reporting and composite HPI, and pronounced fluctuations in the median suspicious 
transaction reporting.  
Given the overall positive growth rates generated by each of the 4 variables, it is 
evident there is an overall, shared upwards trajectory. Of note, since the home price index 
is increasing at a more rapid rate than median income, it can be inferred that affordability 
of home ownership is dwindling. Further, the strong growth of suspicious transaction 
reporting may be aiding in the suppression of the home price index. Altogether, the gap 
appears to be widening between home prices and income, while suspicious transaction 
reporting may be acting as an intervening variable for prevention of this effect. It is also 
necessary to acknowledge the use of median as the measure of central tendency as a 
potential limitation, given its sensitivity to outliers or extreme scores. Overall, given that 
the growth rate of median income was relatively stable over time, and the relationships 
between financial transaction reporting and suspicious transaction reporting in the real 
estate sector with respect to and home prices were tested in hypotheses 1 and 2 
respectively the findings presented in the time-series graph do not add substantial value. 
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Figure 4.2 Growth Rates of National Financial Transaction Reporting, Suspicious 
Transaction Reporting, Composite Home Price Index, and Income in Canada  
(2013 to 2018) 
Table 4.2 Correlation Matrix of Median Growth Variables 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The findings in this thesis indicate that higher overall financial transaction 
reporting in all sectors, as well as suspicious transaction reporting in the real estate sector 
specifically, on average, correspond to higher composite home price indices. While this 
was expected for the first hypothesis (financial transaction reporting in all sectors), it was 
not expected for the second hypothesis (STRs in real estate sector). This is because 
financial transaction reporting was used as a proxy measure of overall financial crimes in 
all markets, whereas suspicious transaction reporting in the real estate sector was used as 
a proxy measure of anti-money laundering (AML) efforts exhibited by the industry. Thus, 
while it was expected that as financial crimes rose, so too would the value of residential 
real estate, as illicit funds permeate the market. However, it was not expected that as real-
estate specific reporting increased, home prices would increase, too, as a stronger AML 
response was thought to combat artificial inflation of home prices.  
Upon further analysis of H2 findings, it is apparent that the overall proportion of 
real estate suspicious transaction reports out of all suspicious transaction reports was only 
0.04% with a range from 0 to only 18 reports, at maximum, per month for the latter 
group. This is even more concerning when we consider that suspicious transaction reports 
represent nearly 75% of all financial transaction reports filed by the real estate industry at 
large. Altogether, this exploratory analysis highlights the real estate industry’s potential 
hesitancy to participate in anti-money laundering efforts. Therefore, the proceeding 
sections will detail proposed strategies to promote real estate activities which would 
combat money laundering, rooted in the review of literature and report findings. A 
combination approach is highly recommended given the extent of harms, of which will 
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need to be carried out and balanced by real estate members, managed by real estate 
agencies, and enforced by regulators. 
5.1 Consequences of Inaction 
Real estate is a primary investment for the proceeds of crime (Schneider, 2004). 
Given the lack of investigation in the real estate market, it is no wonder why criminals 
choose to invest their profits here. As the literature review suggested, it is a harm in itself 
when the rewards of crime are greater than legitimate work (Expert Panel, 2019). 
Specifically, when the proceeds of crime enable individuals to purchase homes which 
members of the working class are unable to afford, it is evident the market is 
problematic. 
Therefore,  in the real estate market, while not as visibly apparent as violent 
crimes, are nonetheless as devastating to the general public. In particular, the findings 
which suggested the composite home price index increases as the level of financial 
transaction reporting (a proxy measure of elite crime) increases is congruent with the 
tone of the literature which suggests money laundering increases home prices. The rise in 
money laundering also reduces the confidence in financial markets, and facilitates 
changes in key market economic variables, including mortgage, interest, and exchange 
rates (Quirk, 1997). Future studies on this topic should include the above-mentioned 
variables to further advance the literature on the relationship between and amongst 
reporting levels and home prices as an indicator of money laundering activity. 
The small fraction of suspicious transaction reports is also evident of the overall 
lack of perceived seriousness of financial crimes. The shielded visibility of money 
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laundering lends itself to a tainted image of its true dangers. In particular, the emotional 
damage, including feelings of shame and guilt, suffered by victims of money laundering 
can be devastating (Levi, 2012; von Lampe, 2008). Thus, to guard against money 
laundering is to guard against the suffering of its potential victims, of which the scope is 
all-encompassing.  
5.2 Responsibilization of the Private Sector 
The FATF’s primary anti-money laundering recommendations include improving 
customer due diligence, record keeping, and suspicious transaction reporting, as well as 
heightening overall transparency, by financial institutions and DNFBPs, of which real 
estate belongs (FATF, 2016). Upon evaluation of Canada’s AML regime, the FATF 
(2016) found that greater supervision of transactions and beneficial ownership disclosure 
was warranted with respect to the real estate sector. The findings of the FATF are 
consistent with the relevant literature, indicating the hesitancy of the real estate industry 
to face additional AML requirements, claiming it would disrupt it as a vital economic 
market (Tellechea, 2008). Furthermore, real estate professions are ill-informed of money 
laundering indicators, often citing majority or full cash transactions exclusively as 
suspicious activity (Expert Panel, 2019). Yet, the integration of the proceeds of crime 
instead typically mimics real market transactions, therefore only adding to the difficulty 
of detection (Expert, 2019). The issue of the unaware (von Lampe, 2008) and unwilling 
professional is thus central to the assessment of AML efforts in the real estate sector.  
Furthermore, primarily financial institutions and real estate agencies should act in 
the best interest of the public to intercept money laundering operations. Overall, the 
frequencies and proportions of suspicious transaction reports in the real estate sector are 
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consistent with the general tone of the relevant scholarship, illuminating their lack of 
implementation. Therefore, the overarching recommendation of the FATF, to improve 
transparency, record keeping, and suspicious transaction reporting has been largely 
ignored by the real estate industry, and it is evident there is unlikely to be any voluntary 
progress in the near future. Simply, despite their awareness of FATF recommendations 
and unique access to the data needed to implement strict measures of financial reporting 
(Borlini, 2013), stronger government intervention is warranted.  
Moreover, regulation recognizes the futility of previous attempts by providing a 
stronger enforcement mechanism (Meeks, 2006). It is well-documented that as regulation 
rises, crime falls, and more specifically, that regulation as a proactive approach reduces 
money laundering activities (Hansen, 2004; Borlini, 2013; Freilich & Newman, 2018). 
This supports the push for stronger reporting requirements by the real estate industry in 
particular, especially when the aforementioned harms are kept in mind. Nonetheless, 
regulation is underutilized as a tool to address crime (Eck & Eck, 2012; Webster, 2015). 
Modifying the conditions under which crime is enabled to flourish is rarely considered, 
and the shifting responsibility to block criminal opportunities at places is similarly 
neglected (Eck & Eck, 2012; Tilley, 2012). Therefore, new and stronger regulations to 
the real estate industry would impose increased education and training by real estate 
members.This regulatory approach also focuses on the biggest ‘polluters’ as place 
managers (representatives) of real estate who have the potential to intercept at critical 
points in the criminal process (Eck & Eck, 2012; Piquero, 2012). 
Additionally, improved and new regulation of the extension of responsibility to 
gatekeepers in the private sector modifies the risk-to-reward ratio perceived by criminals 
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or would-be criminals. Specifically, increased surveillance requires increased 
concealment efforts by perpetrators, and ultimately the opportunity structure changes to 
their demise. In other words, the more difficult it is to launder money, the less incentive 
(and more risk) there is to do so (Expert Panel, 2019). Given that the driving force of 
many criminal operations is the ability to derive a profit, it is vital to interrupt this 
process of monetary legitimization (Levi, 2002). In summary, increasing the risk 
structure through the implementation of more stringent financial transaction reporting 
guidelines, acts as a deterrent to criminal activity.  
The proceeding sections describe potential strategies for intervention and 
enhancement of the risks in the opportunity structure for money laundering in Canadian 
real estate. Therefore, this thesis demonstrates the applicability of the perspective of 
environmental criminology, and specifically routine activity theory, to white collar 
money laundering. Further, the recommendations detailed in the following sections 
describe the potential of real estate agents as place managers to take further responsibility 
for their role in the crime triangle of money laundering. While not at a physical business 
establishment, the extension of the term ‘place manager’ is made as reference to real 
estate agents as controllers of a legitimate business service. Moreover, the additional 
measures proposed for real estate agents act as a control mechanism to protect all 
Canadians as victims of the artificial inflation of real estate caused in part by money 
laundering. At the same time, the recommendations recognize the conflict of interest felt 
by real estate agents as place managers, as they are indirect beneficiaries of the criminal 
activity. Finally, the additional requirements of place managers will aid in deterring the 
investment of the proceeds of white collar crime in the Canadian real estate market, given 
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(1) white collar criminals’ rational decision-making behaviour, and (2) the concentration 
of criminal investment at places with the best opportunities. In other words, given the 
additional proposed regulations imposed upon real estate agents, the risk of detection of 
money laundering will be strengthened, and thus the attractiveness of real estate will be 
diminished. While it is clearly the morally compliant route, it will not be easily nor 
readily adopted. This is because the shifting responsibility comes at a steep monetary and 
resource cost to businesses, especially smaller and independent chains (Borlini, 2013). As 
well, turning away business impedes corporate, shareholder, and employee revenues. 
Therefore, increased sanctions for non-compliance and/or rewards for adherence are 
needed to remedy conflict of interest concerns (Levi, 2012). If stricter measures are not 
taken, real estate organizations will continue to benefit from the proceeds of crime, as 
they do not fear repercussions or feel otherwise motivated to participate in AML 
strategies (Simpson, 2013).  
5.3 Proposed Recommendations to Combat White Collar Money Laundering in the 
Canadian Real Estate Sector 
5.3.1 Commission Incentive 
Given the results that only about half a percent of all financial transaction reports 
are of the suspicious transaction type, it is discernable that, regardless of industry 
divisions, it is a grossly underapplied tool. While the real estate sector is illuminated as a 
poignant threat to financial markets, economies, and communities, it is also clear that 
greater action is needed overall to educate on, encourage, and enforce suspicious 
transaction reporting. Yet, it is understandable why other sectors have similarly not taken 
additional steps to intercept the criminal process given their fiscal conflict of interest. 
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Moreover, like real estate agents who benefit from the commission of a sale (fraudulent 
or not), financial institutions and private lending institutions also reap the rewards of any 
and all financial transactions. More specifically, banks profit off of their customers, 
whether it is from account fees, service charges, mortgage premiums, or otherwise, 
servicing a customer’s financial protection, borrowing, and investment needs directly 
benefits the institution (Cherney, 2018). Therefore, there is a conflict of interest for 
financial institutions, insurance brokers, and brokerages, which exists simply because a 
customer equates to revenue for the company, regardless of the type of customer or 
his/her intentions. 
Furthermore, based on the findings in this paper which illuminate that suspicious 
transaction reporting is significantly under-utilized overall but particularly in the real 
estate sector, it can be argued that greater incentives are warranted to encourage 
participation. The findings that there is an overall lack of financial and suspicious 
transaction reporting is congruent with the estimates by Transparency International 
(2019) that detection of money laundering in Canada is extremely low, resting at less 
than 1%. They are similarly in parallel to the FATF’s (2016) finding that greater 
surveillance and reporting is necessary by the real estate industry. Therefore, given that 
suspicious transaction reporting is known to be a strategy which decreases money 
laundering (Kemal, 2014), its under-application is enabling money laundering to damage 
the economy. 
Moreover, given that real estate agents’ income is largely based on commissions 
from property sales, there is an apparent conflict of interest when intercepting fraudulent 
purchases. That is, if a transaction is reported as suspicious, the agent will not profit from 
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the sale and thus loses his/her source of income. In order to offset these risks to the real 
estate agent, one recommendation is to offer a fixed percentage (of the original home sale 
price) to agents who report suspicious activity which is found to be fraudulent. A 
percentage-based incentive is preferred over a flat-rate, given the commission received 
from home sales is based on a fraction of the sell price.  In conjunction with the 
commission incentive to encourage suspicious transaction reporting by real estate agents, 
further education and training will be warranted to teach sector-specific money 
laundering indicators and stronger know-your-client (KYC) principles. In doing so, it 
may present as favourable to partner with financial institutions to access shared customer 
insights, and work collaboratively to extend guardianship. 
Consistent with Moore and Mill’s (1990) argument that white collar offenders 
should be required to pay monetary damages, it is suggested that home buyers must pay 
this fixed percentage upfront as a non-refundable portion of deposit. In cases where a 
suspicious transaction report is filed and determined to be of criminal intent, the real 
estate agent would be nonetheless entitled to the income percentage. Otherwise, once the 
buyer pays the rest of the purchase price to the seller, the seller would remit the real 
estate agent’s commission as it was already paid. Therefore, this strategy does not impose 
any additional costs to the public, however government oversight to ensure compliance 
would be necessary. Monthly audits on real estate companies are suggested, given the 
ability to compare performance based on the already compiled monthly, historical 
figures. One downside must be noted for this approach, which is that white collar money 
launderers have extensive access to capital, and thus fines may not be considered a 
pertinent risk (Weatherby et al., 2016). Nonetheless, it still makes clear to criminals or 
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would-be criminals the heightened AML regime adopted by the real estate sector, 
especially given their carefully calculated integration decisions for detection purposes. 
 5.3.2 Beneficial Ownership Transparency Database 
Moreover, the primary overarching method used to invest the proceeds of crime 
in real estate is non-disclosure of beneficial ownership (TI, 2019). More specifically, 
nominees or shell companies are used to conceal the true beneficiary of the asset and its 
wealth/growth (Expert Panel, 2019). The practice of not associating one’s own name with 
a sizable asset such as real estate goes against both personal and business financial sense, 
a key indicator of fraudulent behaviour (Sterling, 2015). Therefore, suspicious transaction 
reports should be filed when the beneficiary is unable to be identified. This represents a 
cue in the contextualization analysis of ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’ money 
laundering. Some red flags which should be used by real estate agents include a 
mismatch between employment category/status and income/wealth, the use of a 
corporation’s title, and a high percentage cash investment.  
Specifically, in Ontario, for example, using Form 630, known as the Individual 
Identification Information Record, the Nature of Principal Business or Occupation should 
align with the type/price of the property being purchased. As well, employment letters or 
alternative proof of employment should be required for validation purposes. In cases 
where it does not align, Section B: Verification of Third Parties should be deemed 
especially important, with an emphasis placed on obtaining Third Party Record. 
Nonetheless, clients may opt to not disclose third party involvement, at which point there 
may be reasonable grounds to suspect money laundering and file a suspicious transaction 
report. However, in cases where the third party beneficiary is identified, this information 
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should be compiled in a national database, to be discussed further in the following 
paragraphs.  
In addition to the recommendation of heightened suspicious transaction reporting 
in the real estate industry using the absence of beneficial ownership disclosure as an 
indicator of suspicious activity, conjunctive tools should also be strongly considered. 
Furthermore, given the extent of money laundering in Canada, valued at an estimated $47 
billion in 2018 and increasing property prices in BC by approximately 5% (Expert Panel, 
2019), it is evident with the findings in this thesis that the reporting levels are not 
sufficiently capturing the size of money laundering. Therefore, greater efforts are needed 
beyond motivating real estate professionals to participate in suspicious transaction 
reporting, as detailed in this section.  
In adherence with the counsel provided by the FATF (2016) to improve 
transparency of beneficial ownership, the expert panel on money laundering in BC real 
estate (2019) similarly denotes the necessity of distinguishing the beneficial owner from 
the legal person or owner. To do so, they urge that beneficial ownership disclosure should 
be required for 10% or more, as well as kept in a national registry, similar to the Land 
Ownership Transparency Act (LOTA) in BC (Expert Panel, 2019). Moreover, a Canada-
wide approach in the form of a national database to track/compile beneficial ownership of 
real estate is strongly recommended to improve coordination and data access between 
regions (Expert Panel, 2019). To monitor compliance, a means-based regulatory tool is 
proposed, with the method as the measurable variable. This type of regulation 
acknowledges the inadequate efforts of voluntary participation and innovation previously, 
avoids potential ‘window dressing’ outcomes, and is rooted in the academic discourse 
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and intergovernmental recommendations (Meeks, 2016). It is necessary to acknowledge 
the pushback which may be experienced, including demands that mandatory beneficial 
ownership disclosure infringes on privacy rights. 
Additionally, beneficial ownership of property is commonly concealed using 
corporate titles (Expert Panel, 2019), especially in the case of white collar money 
laundering. Corporate purchases of residential property in the Greater Toronto Area 
account for roughly half of all homes valued at greater than $7 million (TI, 2019). This 
relationship is a likely indicator of high value purchases with the proceeds of white collar 
crime. Furthermore, this is consistent with the findings in this paper that higher levels of 
financial transaction reporting in all sectors, as well as higher levels of suspicious 
transaction reporting in the real estate sector, are matched with higher average home price 
indices. It is therefore necessary to extend the aforementioned recommendations of 
mandatory beneficial ownership disclosure and registry to that of corporations’ purchases 
of residential property. Added to this, further requirements should be imposed upon 
corporate buyers. Some potential strategies include diminishing the limited liability of 
shareholders and implementing a corporate ownership transfer tax upon the purchase of 
property. 
5.3.3 Improved Public Awareness 
Finally, greater public awareness of white collar money laundering in the real 
estate sector is also important. In particular, the federal government should develop 
educational campaigns to illuminate the actions taken against the investment of proceeds 
of crime in property. This recommendation is consistent with the tone of the literature 
that to create a collective shift in perspective, education is needed (Weatherby et al., 
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2016). This reflects the suggestion that policy decisions should bear in mind the current 
perceptions of money laundering’s seriousness and threat potential (Levi, 2012; Levi, 
2014). Moreover, the benefits of this would be far-reaching and numerous. First, the 
problem of money laundering which typically goes unnoticed by society is highlighted. 
Therefore, individuals are more informed of the occurrence and associated risk, thus also 
increasing the level of fear and felt need for action to prevent it. In turn, this would 
hopefully shift the perception of ‘criminal’ away from the urban visible minority. As a 
result of increased awareness, increased public pressure is also applied to hold the 
relevant parties responsible to protect society. Specifically, the real estate industry would 
be scrutinized with respect to their upholding of suspicious transaction reporting, record-
keeping of beneficial ownership, and additional KYC principles. Agencies who do not 
meet the new mandated industry-implemented standards would essentially be excluded 
from the competitive market (Cherney, 2008).  
Moreover, real estate agencies are likely to adhere to prevent damaged reputations 
and further regulations from being enacted, disrupting business practices again. At the 
same time, faith in the government as a public institution is somewhat restored given its 
apparent attention to the issue in our collective best interest (Moore & Mills, 1990; Levi, 
2012). At the heart of it, all individuals have a stake in this issue, since it affects a prime 
need of all humans – shelter. That is, the infiltration of money laundering in property 
investments impedes the ability to both buy and sell homes.  
5.4 Limitations 
While the findings are indicative of the current state of research on money 
laundering and the regulations enacted against fraudulent financial activities, it is 
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necessary to acknowledge the limitations of this study. In particular, the lack of scholarly 
and policy attention given to combatting the entrance of proceeds of crime into the 
legitimate economy poses several limitations to this analysis. First, public data on this 
topic is sparse, and thus the variables available to use in the analysis are limited. 
Relatedly, FINTRAC should make available to the public more historical years and 
provide greater granularity of reporting details (purpose, results, etc.) Second, the nature 
of money laundering is inherently difficult to measure given its purpose is to conceal its 
roots. FINTRAC only provides the frequency of financial transaction reports by type, 
region, and date. Additional data which would be useful for the study of money 
laundering in Canadian real estate would be the indicators/explanations for why each 
report was filed, as well as their outcome (found to be of criminal intent or not). In 
particular, with respect to suspicious transaction reports filed by the real estate sector, 
information regarding whether the report was filed for the buyer or seller, and what the 
monetary value of the property was, would be beneficial. This further hinders the ability 
to directly connect money laundering to other variables for the purpose of explanatory or 
prediction models. Thus, utilizing a reporting as a proxy measure for money laundering 
should be interpreted with caution.  
Third, suspicious activity is not synonymous with criminal activity, and this 
should be kept in mind when interpreting the frequency distributions and comparison of 
means tests. Fourth, the observed low frequency of suspicious transaction reporting in 
real estate is potentially because there is infrequent suspicious activity to report, or that it 
was detected by another party before it reached the real estate sector (e.g., financial 
institution, lender, etc.). However, this paper argues that this is not the case, and instead 
85 
 
represents a regulatory loophole whereby real estate agents are not compelled to report 
suspicious activity, and is thus exploited by money launderers. Finally, regarding the 
positive, linear relationship noted between the variables, it should be understood as a 
measure of correlation and not causation. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess for 
causation, and thus limited to show a significant analysis of variance as a mechanism to 
advocate for increased industry financial reporting regulations. 
Furthermore, in adherence with the positivist paradigm and quantitative research 
as a “natural scientific standard of proof” (Seale, 2011, p. 100), there are three criterions 
that need to be met in order to deem the results as precise and accurate, namely validity, 
reliability, and generalizability. Firstly, there are 2 types of validity: internal and external. 
Internal validity is concerned with considering intervening variables’ potential impact on 
the causal explanation. Specifically, this means that control groups should be identified 
and tested to ensure the original relationship holds true (Seale, 2011). The scope of this 
project did not allow for a control variable to be tested, so internal validity is at risk. 
Specifically, macroeconomic tools, such as the interest, inflation, and mortgage rates 
would be useful to understand external factors which may also be contributing to the 
riding Canadian home price index over time. Since these figures are typically reported as 
annual rates, rather than the monthly level of analysis shared by the MLS and FINTRAC 
datasets, as well as the limited time and scope requirements of this thesis, the application 
of control variables was not possible. As well, analyses of the relationships in hypotheses 
1 and 2, broken down by municipality, would add value to the study. However, the 
datasets did not share a mutual breakdown of this information. External validity refers to 
“random sampling and probabilistic reasoning” (Seale, 2011, p. 5), meaning that each 
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person in the target population had an equal chance of being included in the sample and 
thus in accordance with the Central Limit Theorem, the larger the sample size, the more 
closely it will represent that population (and accuracy of results will be improved). The 
MLS and FINTRAC datasets have adequate sample sizes, hinged on a shared timespan of 
93 months.  
Next, reliability ensures that the test is measuring what it is supposed to, there is 
internal consistency, and replicability is possible (Heale & Twycross, 2015). The 
statistical tests used in this report could be duplicated by another researcher. Finally, 
generalizability is necessary to say that the results can be applied on a macro level. The 
findings are on a national scale, and thus generalizability for the Canadian market is 
inherent. To reiterate, since positivism is about seeing straight to the truth and objectivity 
is at its very essence, it is fundamentally important to ensure validity, reliability, and 
generalizability of research results, which must be carefully considered during the 
research design, collection, and analysis stages. 
5.5 Future Research Directions 
White collar money laundering in Canadian real estate remains underexplored, 
especially from a criminological lens. Given the findings of low suspicious transaction 
reporting in the real estate sector to deter money laundering activities, coupled with the 
overall result of struggles with home ownership affordability, it is paramount that 
additional, related research avenues are explored. Firstly, as Braithwaite (1985) notes, 
regulation and enforcement mechanisms are strengthened with the addition of criminal 
punishment. Furthermore, with heightened reporting by real estate members, increased 
suspicious activity will follow, of which will need to be addressed. Therefore, exploring 
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the routes to criminalization of white collar money launderers, with the knowledge of 
their upper class influence on the criminal justice system kept in mind (Sutherland, 1940) 
is essential.  
Additionally, the disclosure of white collar criminal’s identities (both corporate 
and individual) should be considered, as publicity of their offenses may act as a severe 
form of punishment, damaging their reputations and networks (Benson, 1985). 
Specifically, the viability and routes of publicity and related shaming should be 
investigated. Subsequently, further research is warranted on the violent tendencies of 
white collar criminals, especially given the increased risk in connection with detection 
(Brody & Kiehl, 2010), which is heightened with improved reporting. As well, beyond 
the recommended stronger regulation and enforcement of suspicious transaction reporting 
and beneficial ownership disclosure outlined in this thesis, avenues for corporate social 
responsibility should be examined to go beyond mandated protocols recommended. 
Finally, the displacement of crime should also be considered, as white collar money 
launderers will likely move away from investing in real estate as regulation rises, and 
towards another opportunity. 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
This paper has helped fill a research void on crime in the real estate sector by 
adding a criminological lens and assessments of the effect of money laundering on the 
real estate market and home ownership affordability. Further, it has extended research on 
the privileged position that white collar criminals use to integrate their funds into the 
legitimate market, and consequently deter legal transactions (Quirk, 1997). From the 
perspective of social justice, it has shown that beyond the harm of crime being more 
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financially rewarding than legitimate work itself (Expert Panel, 2019), real-estate related 
money laundering has not been addressed with effective regulation or enforcement. Thus, 
given the low risks measured by the low level of financial transaction reporting in the 
sector, and the high monetary rewards of owning property, it is no wonder there is an 
incentive to offend (Braithwaite, 1985). 
Moreover, this thesis has illustrated the ability of real estate members to intercept 
opportunities for money laundering. It has explored the role of the private sector, 
specifically the real estate industry, in preventing money laundering. Further, it has 
shown that there is insufficient action with respect to anti-money laundering efforts on 
the part of real estate agencies, indicated by a lack of overall financial and suspicious 
transaction reporting. Therefore, in adherence with the extant review of literature, it is 
fitting to recommend an incentive to overcome the conflict of interest felt by real estate 
agents to report a suspicious purchase, to create a national database for disclosure of 
beneficial ownership, and to further examine corporate purchases of residential property. 
The beneficial ownership database would also aid in flagging illicit transactions to file a 
suspicious transaction report. Taken altogether, filling the gap of needed increased 
surveillance, scrutiny, and regulation of the real estate sector in Canada can help to deter 
criminal operations domestically, as well as set new standards for anti-money laundering 
regimes internationally. 
Publicizing the new recommended programs would also be extremely 
advantageous, as it would enhance the perceived seriousness of money laundering by the 
public, hold the private sector more accountable, and advertise to would-be criminals that 
Canada has a strict anti-money laundering program in place. Overall, additional 
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regulations and enforcement act as a strong mechanism to reduce the harms borne by 
money laundering (TI, 2019; Hansen, 2004), and improves the likelihood of home 
ownership affordability by reducing illegitimate market transactions (Quirk, 1997). In 
conclusion, deteriorating the ease with which illicit funds are invested in real estate 
through the aforementioned strategies acts as a barrier and enhanced risk to white collar 
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